

Weiss

TOP SECRET

14

STATUS OF BERLIN
CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Prepared by:

QUADRIPARTITE CONTINGENCY COORDINATING
SUBGROUP

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
 Retain class'n Change/classify to SECRET
 Declassify with concurrence of _____
after 10/4/05
EO 12958, 25X (9) P. Lord Date 9-19-00
IPS/CR/IR by _____
TAB 27

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 Retain class'n X Change/Classify to S
 With concurrence of _____
 Declassify Draft and process as group
EO 12356, Sec. 1.2(a) (1)
FPC/DDR by PDM 11/5/95
Withdrawal No. 1-26

BQD - CC 1 (Fourth Revision)
November 17, 1961

TOP SECRET

Weiss

TOP SECRET

14

STATUS OF BERLIN
CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Prepared by:

QUADRIPARTITE CONTINGENCY COORDINATING
SUBGROUP

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
 Retain class'n Change/classify to SECRET
 Declassify with concurrence of _____
after _____
EO 12958, 25X (9) 10/4/05
IPS/CR/IR by P. Lord Date: 9-19-00
TAB 27

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 Retain class'n X Change/Classify to S
 With concurrence of _____
 Declassify Draft and process as group
EO 12356, Sec. 1.2(a) (1)
FPC/DDR by PDM 11/5/95
Withdrawal No. 1-26

BQD - CC 1 (Fourth Revision)
November 17, 1961

TOP SECRET

STATUS OF BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Quadripartite Contingency Coordinating Subgroup

1. The attached chart is an interim status report of Berlin contingency planning prepared at the request of the Ambassadorial Group for its use and to assist Governments in considering various questions covered therein. It has not been approved by any government, although it reflects government positions where specifically indicated. It supersedes the draft distributed on November 1, 1961. Since that time each section has to some degree been revised. The revision of Section III - Harassment Within Berlin - has been minimal pending receipt by the Subgroup of the full results of the study of the Section in Bonn and Berlin, where it was sent October 2 for examination and in some cases application as appropriate.
2. Future revisions of the chart will contain more detailed references both to military operations and to military countermeasures. Detailed planning in these two fields has not as yet been carried to the point where it can be integrated into the chart. The principal purpose of the references in this report is simply to note that these factors will have to be considered in dealing with the contingency. Planning is proceeding urgently, however, and it is anticipated that it will be integrated in due course. Maritime control measures, in addition, are still being considered in stages preliminary to any specific inclusion in contingency plans. References to all these matters in the chart are not intended to prejudge the manner in which they may eventually be integrated in the plans.
3. It is clear from the chart that there are a number of outstanding points on which it would be desirable to get quadripartite agreement, and accordingly it is recommended that Governments review their positions to this end.
4. Governments are already making preparations necessary to enable them to carry out countermeasures. It is hoped that these preparations will be pressed ahead as rapidly as possible. It is recommended that the Ambassadorial Group be kept informed as preparations are completed for the use of particular measures so that a quadripartite status record may be maintained in this regard.
5. Consideration will have to be given to how NATO should further be brought into contingency planning.
6. The chart is a very sensitive document. It should be handled with special care and detailed records should be kept of the whereabouts of each copy.

STATUS OF BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Quadripartite Contingency Coordinating Subgroup

1. The attached chart is an interim status report of Berlin contingency planning prepared at the request of the Ambassadorial Group for its use and to assist Governments in considering various questions covered therein. It has not been approved by any government, although it reflects government positions where specifically indicated. It supersedes the draft distributed on November 1, 1961. Since that time each section has to some degree been revised. The revision of Section III - Harassment Within Berlin - has been minimal pending receipt by the Subgroup of the full results of the study of the Section in Bonn and Berlin, where it was sent October 2 for examination and in some cases application as appropriate.
2. Future revisions of the chart will contain more detailed references both to military operations and to military countermeasures. Detailed planning in these two fields has not as yet been carried to the point where it can be integrated into the chart. The principal purpose of the references in this report is simply to note that these factors will have to be considered in dealing with the contingency. Planning is proceeding urgently, however, and it is anticipated that it will be integrated in due course. Maritime control measures, in addition, are still being considered in stages preliminary to any specific inclusion in contingency plans. References to all these matters in the chart are not intended to prejudge the manner in which they may eventually be integrated in the plans.
3. It is clear from the chart that there are a number of outstanding points on which it would be desirable to get quadripartite agreement, and accordingly it is recommended that Governments review their positions to this end.
4. Governments are already making preparations necessary to enable them to carry out countermeasures. It is hoped that these preparations will be pressed ahead as rapidly as possible. It is recommended that the Ambassadorial Group be kept informed as preparations are completed for the use of particular measures so that a quadripartite status record may be maintained in this regard.
5. Consideration will have to be given to how NATO should further be brought into contingency planning.
6. The chart is a very sensitive document. It should be handled with special care and detailed records should be kept of the whereabouts of each copy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(Contingencies Covered in the Chart)

- I. INTERFERENCE WITH AIR ACCESS TO BERLIN 1
 - A. Harassments Not Affecting Flight Safety 1
 - B. Harassment Affecting Flight Safety But Short of Downing an Aircraft 1
 - 1. Administrative (Without Use of Force) 2
 - 2. Soviet/GDR Measures to Endanger Flight Safety by ECM Activity 2
 - 3. Soviet/GDR Physical Harassment 7
 - C. Shooting or Forcing Down by Military Action of Unescorted Civil or Military Transport 7
 - D. Interference With Escorted Transport 8
 - 1. Attack Upon an Escorted Aircraft by Other Aircraft 10
 - 2. Attack Upon an Escorted Aircraft by Ground Fire, or the Use of Ground Obstacles 10
 - E. All-out Attempt to Halt Air Transport 11
 - F. Determined Efforts to Interdict Allied Air Transport, of All Categories, Ground Access Being Closed 14
- II. INTERFERENCE WITH GROUND ACCESS TO BERLIN 17
 - A. Interference With Allied Traffic But Not German Civilian Traffic, by Soviets or GDR 18
 - 1. Harassments Short of Blockage 18
 - 2. Blockage of Allied Road or Rail Access Through Introduction of Unacceptable Controls 18
 - 3. Blockage of Allied Road or Rail Access by forcible Closure 20
 - 4. Blockage of Allied Road and Rail Access by Any Means, Air Access Being Open 22
 - 5. Blockage of Allied Road and Rail Access by Any Means, Air Access Being Closed 22
 - B. Interference With German But Not Allied Ground Access 24
 - 1. Harassments Short of Blockage 26
 - 2. Blockage of Rail, Road or Barge Traffic or Two or All of Them 26
 - C. Blockage of Both Allied and German Ground Access, Air Access Being Open 27
 - D. Blockage of Both Allied and German Ground Access, Air Access Being Closed 30
- III. HARASSMENTS WITHIN BERLIN 32
 - 33

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(Contingencies Covered in the Chart)

- I. INTERFERENCE WITH AIR ACCESS TO BERLIN 1
 - A. Harassments Not Affecting Flight Safety 1
 - B. Harassment Affecting Flight Safety But Short of Downing an Aircraft 1
 - 1. Administrative (Without Use of Force) 2
 - 2. Soviet/GDR Measures to Endanger Flight Safety by ECM Activity 2
 - 3. Soviet/GDR Physical Harassment 7
 - C. Shooting or Forcing Down by Military Action of Unescorted Civil or Military Transport 7
 - D. Interference With Escorted Transport 8
 - 1. Attack Upon an Escorted Aircraft by Other Aircraft 10
 - 2. Attack Upon an Escorted Aircraft by Ground Fire, or the Use of Ground Obstacles 10
 - E. All-out Attempt to Halt Air Transport 11
 - F. Determined Efforts to Interdict Allied Air Transport, of All Categories, Ground Access Being Closed 14
- II. INTERFERENCE WITH GROUND ACCESS TO BERLIN 17
 - A. Interference With Allied Traffic But Not German Civilian Traffic, by Soviets or GDR 18
 - 1. Harassments Short of Blockage 18
 - 2. Blockage of Allied Road or Rail Access Through Introduction of Unacceptable Controls 18
 - 3. Blockage of Allied Road or Rail Access by forcible Closure 20
 - 4. Blockage of Allied Road and Rail Access by Any Means, Air Access Being Open 22
 - 5. Blockage of Allied Road and Rail Access by Any Means, Air Access Being Closed 22
 - B. Interference With German But Not Allied Ground Access 24
 - 1. Harassments Short of Blockage 26
 - 2. Blockage of Rail, Road or Barge Traffic or Two or All of Them 26
 - C. Blockage of Both Allied and German Ground Access, Air Access Being Open 27
 - D. Blockage of Both Allied and German Ground Access, Air Access Being Closed 30
- III. HARASSMENTS WITHIN BERLIN 32
 - 33

- A. Interference With Allied Access to East Berlin 33
 - 1. Harassment But Not Denial of Allied Access to East Berlin 33
 - 2. Denial of Allied Access to East Berlin 33
- B. Interference With West German and West Berliner Access to East Berlin 35
 - 1. Further Restriction on But Not Denial of Entry of West Germans and West Berliners to East Berlin 36
 - 2. Denial of Entry of West Germans and West Berliners Into East Berlin 36
- C. Harassment of or Attack Upon West Berlin 37
 - 1. East German Psychological, Economic or Political Harassment of West Berlin 38
 - 2. East German/Soviet Move to Seize West Berlin by Force, or Harassment by Military Means 38
- IV. SOVIET POLITICAL MOVES 43
 - A. Announcement of a "Peace Conference" 45
 - B. Signature of a "Peace Treaty" 45
 - C. Turnover of Access Control to the GDR 45

A. Interference With Allied Access to East Berlin 33

 1. Harassment But Not Denial of Allied Access to East Berlin 33

 2. Denial of Allied Access to East Berlin 33

B. Interference With West German and West Berliner Access to East Berlin 35

 1. Further Restriction on But Not Denial of Entry of West Germans and West Berliners to East Berlin 36

 2. Denial of Entry of West Germans and West Berliners Into East Berlin 36

C. Harassment of or Attack Upon West Berlin 37

 1. East German Psychological, Economic or Political Harassment of West Berlin 38

 2. East German/Soviet Move to Seize West Berlin by Force, or Harassment by Military Means 38

IV. SOVIET POLITICAL MOVES 43

 A. Announcement of a "Peace Conference" 45

 B. Signature of a "Peace Treaty" 45

 C. Turnover of Access Control to the GDR 45

ANNEXES

Minor Countermeasures Annex A

Major Countermeasures Annex B

Countermeasures for Interference with Air Access Annex C

The Interzonal Trade Agreement Annex D

Countermeasures for Blockage of
Either Allied or German
Land Access Annex E

Air Access - Relevant Texts and
Instructions (to be expanded) Annex F

Status of Preparations and Studies
on Raising the Berlin Issue
in the UN Annex G
(In preparation)

ANNEXES

Minor Countermeasures	Annex A
Major Countermeasures	Annex B
Countermeasures for Interference with Air Access	Annex C
The Interzonal Trade Agreement	Annex D
Countermeasures for Blockage of Either Allied or German Land Access	Annex E
Air Access - Relevant Texts and Instructions (to be expanded)	Annex F
Status of Preparations and Studies on Raising the Berlin Issue in the UN	Annex G (In preparation)

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
I. INTERFERENCE WITH AIR ACCESS TO BERLIN	In addition to responses to specific contingencies listed below, the following general responses will obtain:			The treatment of Sections I A-E assumes that ground access is still open. Section I F treats the case of attempts to halt air access already being closed.
A. <u>Harrassments not affecting flight safety</u>	Continue present civil and military flights;		Agreed	
	Fighter aircraft excluded from air corridors on political grounds but legal right to do so maintained;		Agreed	
	Continue current practice of flying high FRG government officials in military transport under instructions to avoid if possible landing in East Germany		Agreed current practice.	
1. Continued Soviet/GDR demands that Allied traffic be limited to Allied garrison needs.	Rejection on the grounds that Allied use of the corridors is unrestricted, using among other arguments contained in August 26 Three Power notes to USSR (Annex F.)	None	Agreed among Four Powers	
2. Request that Allied planes report to GDR radio station in accordance with GDR radio law of August 1, 1961.	Civil airline pilots, when queried by GDR radio, should identify themselves and state flight proceeding to (from) Berlin in accordance with plan filed in BASC. Military pilots make no reply.	None	Agreed among the Three Powers	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
I. INTERFERENCE WITH AIR ACCESS TO BERLIN	In addition to responses to specific contingencies listed below, the following general responses will obtain:			The treatment of Sections I A-E assumes that ground access is still open. Section I F treats the case of attempts to halt air access already being closed.
A. <u>Harrassments not affecting flight safety</u>	Continue present civil and military flights;		Agreed	
	Fighter aircraft excluded from air corridors on political grounds but legal right to do so maintained;		Agreed	
	Continue current practice of flying high FRG government officials in military transport under instructions to avoid if possible landing in East Germany		Agreed current practice.	
1. Continued Soviet/GDR demands that Allied traffic be limited to Allied garrison needs.	Rejection on the grounds that Allied use of the corridors is unrestricted, using among other arguments contained in August 26 Three Power notes to USSR (Annex F.)	None	Agreed among Four Powers	
2. Request that Allied planes report to GDR radio station in accordance with GDR radio law of August 1, 1961.	Civil airline pilots, when queried by GDR radio, should identify themselves and state flight proceeding to (from) Berlin in accordance with plan filed in BASC. Military pilots make no reply.	None	Agreed among the Three Powers	

Development in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p>3. GDR demand that airlines register their radios under the August 1 law.</p>	<p>The demand should be rejected with the argument that Allied flights in the corridors are not subject to any form of GDR control.</p>	<p>Protest to Soviet Controller. A protest to the Soviet Government if non-compliance is declared punishable by physical interference.</p>	<p>Prepared statement is quadripartitely agreed. (See Annex F). Decision on protest would be made at the time at the appropriate level.</p>	
<p><u>B. Harassment affecting flight safety but short of downing an aircraft.</u></p>		<p>Take countermeasures in the travel and air traffic fields (Annex C) when civil airline operations are halted.</p>	<p>This is the position of the US, France and Germany on countermeasures. The UK will consider at the time.</p>	
<p>1. Administrative (without use of force).</p>			<p>NATO has agreed* that "in the event of the Soviets enforcing a partial interdiction of NATO air traffic (civil or military) to or from West Berlin, the three measures listed [Annex C] constitute an appropriate response, it being understood that, if this situation arose, the Council would at once meet to decide what action should be taken." NATO also agreed "that the Governments will make without delay the necessary plans to enable them to implement these measures..."</p>	
			<p>*All except Canada</p>	

Development in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p>3. GDR demand that airlines register their radios under the August 1 law.</p>	<p>The demand should be rejected with the argument that Allied flights in the corridors are not subject to any form of GDR control.</p>	<p>Protest to Soviet Controller. A protest to the Soviet Government if non-compliance is declared punishable by physical interference.</p>	<p>Prepared statement is quadripartitely agreed. (See Annex F). Decision on protest would be made at the time at the appropriate level.</p>	
<p><u>B. Harassment affecting flight safety but short of downing an aircraft.</u></p>		<p>Take countermeasures in the travel and air traffic fields (Annex C) when civil airline operations are halted.</p>	<p>This is the position of the US, France and Germany on countermeasures. The UK will consider at the time.</p>	
<p>1. Administrative (without use of force).</p>			<p>NATO has agreed* that "in the event of the Soviets enforcing a partial interdiction of NATO air traffic (civil or military) to or from West Berlin, the three measures listed [Annex C] constitute an appropriate response, it being understood that, if this situation arose, the Council would at once meet to decide what action should be taken." NATO also agreed "that the Governments will make without delay the necessary plans to enable them to implement these measures..."</p>	
			<p>*All except Canada</p>	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
	<p>Continue civil flights as long as practicable from flight safety view. If airlines and/or technical authorities determine regular civil flights are unsafe or impractical, the following will apply in addition to specific responses listed for separate contingencies:</p> <p>Continue civil flights on reduced scale with military air crews in uniform. (Flights on this basis may be instituted for individual airlines.) General Norstad at his discretion may fly probe flights without passengers.</p>		<p>Policy on continuing civil flights is agreed by US, UK and France.</p>	
	<p>Supplement such flights with military transports as practicable and necessary to maintain traffic as required.</p>		<p>UK-US agreed position. For the present the UK would only be able to fly civil aircraft probes without passengers. UK discussions are still in progress on the legal, financial and administrative arrangements for flying UK civil aircraft with passengers and military crews. French position is: shift to unescorted transport while continuing a few civil flights without passengers with requisitioned civilian crews as long as military transports meet with no opposition. Decision to shift to military aircraft will be taken by the French Government.</p>	<p>Tripartite agreement is being sought.</p> <p>It is understood that the discretion given General Norstad to fly probe flights without passengers in the response immedi-</p>
			<p>US and UK consider General Norstad has discretion. French position is: shift to unescorted transport while continuing a few civil flights without passengers with requisitioned civilian</p>	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
	<p>Continue civil flights as long as practicable from flight safety view. If airlines and/or technical authorities determine regular civil flights are unsafe or impractical, the following will apply in addition to specific responses listed for separate contingencies:</p> <p>Continue civil flights on reduced scale with military air crews in uniform. (Flights on this basis may be instituted for individual airlines.) General Norstad at his discretion may fly probe flights without passengers.</p>		<p>Policy on continuing civil flights is agreed by US, UK and France.</p>	
	<p>Supplement such flights with military transports as practicable and necessary to maintain traffic as required.</p>		<p>UK-US agreed position. For the present the UK would only be able to fly civil aircraft probes without passengers. UK discussions are still in progress on the legal, financial and administrative arrangements for flying UK civil aircraft with passengers and military crews. French position is: shift to unescorted transport while continuing a few civil flights without passengers with requisitioned civilian crews as long as military transports meet with no opposition. Decision to shift to military aircraft will be taken by the French Government.</p>	<p>Tripartite agreement is being sought.</p> <p>It is understood that the discretion given General Norstad to fly probe flights without passengers in the response immedi-</p>
			<p>US and UK consider General Norstad has discretion. French position is: Shift to unescorted transport while continuing a few civil flights without passengers with requisitioned civilian</p>	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
			crews as long as military transports meet with no opposition. Decision to shift to military aircraft will be taken by the French Government.	ately above applies also to this response.
	Civil and military flights under operational control of JACK PINE Command Post.		US, UK and French agree for military flights. French reserve position on civil flights.	Tripartite agreement being sought.
	Take action to prevent hijacking (armed guards and locked cockpits) of civil aircraft with military crews.		US and UK agree General Norstad has discretion. French no objection.	
	Fighters placed on air alert at corridor entrances, if circumstances require.		US and UK agree General Norstad has discretion to implement on basis of JACK PINE II.	Tripartite agreement being sought.
			French position: Decision to use fighters for indirect protection will be taken by governments with announcement.	
	Before flights initiated Governments through Ambassadors in Bonn in consultation with the Federal Government issue statement on following lines. Because of Soviet/GDR action the governments of the US, UK and France have found it necessary to take some additional measures in the exercise of their responsibility for safe continu-		US and UK agree. French position under consideration.	Military subgroup is considering the question of advance preparation of a statement. (BQD M9) Tripartite agreement being sought.

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
			crews as long as military transports meet with no opposition. Decision to shift to military aircraft will be taken by the French Government.	ately above applies also to this response.
	Civil and military flights under operational control of JACK PINE Command Post.		US, UK and French agree for military flights. French reserve position on civil flights.	Tripartite agreement being sought.
	Take action to prevent hijacking (armed guards and locked cockpits) of civil aircraft with military crews.		US and UK agree General Norstad has discretion. French no objection.	
	Fighters placed on air alert at corridor entrances, if circumstances require.		US and UK agree General Norstad has discretion to implement on basis of JACK PINE II.	Tripartite agreement being sought.
			French position: Decision to use fighters for indirect protection will be taken by governments with announcement.	
	Before flights initiated Governments through Ambassadors in Bonn in consultation with the Federal Government issue statement on following lines. Because of Soviet/GDR action the governments of the US, UK and France have found it necessary to take some additional measures in the exercise of their responsibility for safe continu-		US and UK agree. French position under consideration.	Military subgroup is considering the question of advance preparation of a statement. (BQD M9) Tripartite agreement being sought.

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
	<p>ation of air traffic to Berlin. Accordingly, the governments concerned will take appropriate measures to achieve this, including as necessary, the provision of fighter protection, and in some cases, military crews to fly civil air transport. The three governments hold the Soviet Union responsible for any incidents which follow.</p> <p><u>French Approach</u> Shift to military transport. Continue civil flights without passengers on reduced scale with requisitioned civilian crews.</p>			<p>French position: shift to unescorted transport while continuing a few civil flights without passengers with requisitioned civilian crews as long as military transports meet with no opposition. Decision to shift to military aircraft will be taken by the French Government.</p>
<p>a) Soviet/GDR insistence that commercial air operations, as distinct from Allied military operations, be the subject of regular agreements.</p>	<p>This demand should be rejected, since all Allied air operations have an equal right in the corridors.</p>	<p>Protest to Soviet Controller. A protest to the Soviet Government if non-compliance is declared to be punishable by physical interference.</p>	<p>Decision on protest would be made at the time at the appropriate level.</p>	
<p>b) Soviet refusal to guarantee flight safety for a particular flight or flights.</p>	<p>Proceed with flight or flights, if airlines willing. If they are not, proceed in accordance with initial response in IBI.</p>	<p>A protest to the Soviet Controller, possibly followed by protest to Soviet Government.</p>	<p>Same as above.</p>	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
	<p>ation of air traffic to Berlin. Accordingly, the governments concerned will take appropriate measures to achieve this, including as necessary, the provision of fighter protection, and in some cases, military crews to fly civil air transport. The three governments hold the Soviet Union responsible for any incidents which follow.</p> <p><u>French Approach</u> Shift to military transport. Continue civil flights without passengers on reduced scale with requisitioned civilian crews.</p>			<p>French position: shift to unescorted transport while continuing a few civil flights without passengers with requisitioned civilian crews as long as military transports meet with no opposition. Decision to shift to military aircraft will be taken by the French Government.</p>
<p>a) Soviet/GDR insistence that commercial air operations, as distinct from Allied military operations, be the subject of regular agreements.</p>	<p>This demand should be rejected, since all Allied air operations have an equal right in the corridors.</p>	<p>Protest to Soviet Controller. A protest to the Soviet Government if non-compliance is declared to be punishable by physical interference.</p>	<p>Decision on protest would be made at the time at the appropriate level.</p>	
<p>b) Soviet refusal to guarantee flight safety for a particular flight or flights.</p>	<p>Proceed with flight or flights, if airlines willing. If they are not, proceed in accordance with initial response in IBI.</p>	<p>A protest to the Soviet Controller, possibly followed by protest to Soviet Government.</p>	<p>Same as above.</p>	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
c) Soviet refusal to guarantee flight safety of further flights.	Same as above.	Same as above.	Same as above.	
d) Soviet withdrawal from BASC.	Western controllers make statement to Soviet controller. If so instructed by their POLADS, controllers will inform Soviet Controller concerning substitute channels for passing flight information. If so instructed by their POLADS, controllers will request Tempelhof ATC to inform Allied pilots airborne or about to take off that Soviets have left BASC. Deny entry to any East German replacement. Put into effect agreed method of passing flight information. Issue public statement and consider note to the Soviet Government.		The responses are tripartitely agreed (BERCON TRI D-11b) except for the public statement. Text is agreed of statement to Soviet controller.	This eventually could occur at any time as a deliberate Soviet move to end civil air transport, as a retaliation for restriction on movement of Soviet personnel in West Berlin, etc. It might well occur, in any case, when the Soviets sign a peace treaty with the GDR. Further study is being given quadripartitely in Bonn to other ways of dealing with this contingency.
e) A number of possible actions are open to the GDR/Soviets whereby the corridors would be declared unsafe for use without an explicit barring of flights. An announcement of maneuvers or anti-	A protest to the Soviet Controller or the Soviet Government, depending on the seriousness. Issuance of a public statement. Consider demanding alternate routes on the grounds that our basic right is air		A text from which a statement and note can be drawn is quadripartitely agreed. Decision to be taken by Governments at the time. Same as above. Same as above.	US legal experts find no objection to this course of action.

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
c) Soviet refusal to guarantee flight safety of further flights.	Same as above.	Same as above.	Same as above.	
d) Soviet withdrawal from BASC.	Western controllers make statement to Soviet controller. If so instructed by their POLADS, controllers will inform Soviet Controller concerning substitute channels for passing flight information. If so instructed by their POLADS, controllers will request Tempelhof ATC to inform Allied pilots airborne or about to take off that Soviets have left BASC. Deny entry to any East German replacement. Put into effect agreed method of passing flight information. Issue public statement and consider note to the Soviet Government.		The responses are tripartitely agreed (BERCON TRI D-11b) except for the public statement. Text is agreed of statement to Soviet controller.	This eventually could occur at any time as a deliberate Soviet move to end civil air transport, as a retaliation for restriction on movement of Soviet personnel in West Berlin, etc. It might well occur, in any case, when the Soviets sign a peace treaty with the GDR. Further study is being given quadripartitely in Bonn to other ways of dealing with this contingency.
e) A number of possible actions are open to the GDR/Soviets whereby the corridors would be declared unsafe for use without an explicit barring of flights. An announcement of maneuvers or anti-	A protest to the Soviet Controller or the Soviet Government, depending on the seriousness. Issuance of a public statement. Consider demanding alternate routes on the grounds that our basic right is air		A text from which a statement and note can be drawn is quadripartitely agreed. Decision to be taken by Governments at the time. Same as above. Same as above.	US legal experts find no objection to this course of action.

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
aircraft firing practice in the area are typical.	access <u>per se</u> and not these corridors.	Countermeasures should be taken commensurate with the severity of the harassment. Possible electronic countermeasures on our part are being considered.	Agreed by US and FRG. Under urgent consideration by UK and French Governments (response).	US to provide requisite information, plans, and equipment to accomplish this subject to conclusion of necessary arrangements between governments.
2. Soviet/GDR measures to endanger flight safety by ECM activity.	Improve VFR capability in area and institute newest ECCM equipment and procedures.	Countermeasures should be taken commensurate with the severity of the harassment. Possible electronic countermeasures on our part are being considered.	Countermeasures to be decided at the time by Governments.	US to provide requisite information, plans, and equipment to accomplish this subject to conclusion of necessary arrangements between governments.
3. Soviet/GDR physical harassments of civil flights with military crews or military transports.	General Norstad at his discretion authorized to use fighter protection on basis of JCS instructions of 31 August 1961 and JACK PINE II rules of engagement. (See Annex F for JACK PINE rules of engagement.)	Immediate appeal to the United Nations Security Council if fighter protection is introduced.	US-UK agreed position. French position: decision to introduce escorts will be taken by governments.	Ambassadors at Bonn in consultation with the Federal Republic should confirm publicly that in accordance with previous statement [page above] fighter protection has been initiated.
		Take countermeasures in the travel and air traffic fields. (Annex C)	See below under I C.	If there is to be an appeal to the Security Council it is desirable that the Allies' response and countermeasures if any should have been made before the Security Council meets.
			This is the position of the US, France and Germany. The UK will consider at the time. If incident is serious enough to warrant fighter protection, it is Quadripartitely agreed to take these countermeasures.	* NATO has agreed that "in the event of the Soviets enforcing a partial interdiction of NATO air traffic (civil or military) to or from West Berlin, the three measures listed [Annex C] constitute an appropriate response, it being understood that, if this situation arose, the Council would at once meet to decide what action should be taken." NATO also agreed "that the Governments will make without delay the necessary plans to enable them to implement these measures. . . ."

*All except Canada

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
aircraft firing practice in the area are typical.	access <u>per se</u> and not these corridors.	Countermeasures should be taken commensurate with the severity of the harassment. Possible electronic countermeasures on our part are being considered.	Agreed by US and FRG. Under urgent consideration by UK and French Governments (response).	US to provide requisite information, plans, and equipment to accomplish this subject to conclusion of necessary arrangements between governments.
2. Soviet/GDR measures to endanger flight safety by ECM activity.	Improve VFR capability in area and institute newest ECCM equipment and procedures.	Countermeasures should be taken commensurate with the severity of the harassment. Possible electronic countermeasures on our part are being considered.	Countermeasures to be decided at the time by Governments.	US to provide requisite information, plans, and equipment to accomplish this subject to conclusion of necessary arrangements between governments.
3. Soviet/GDR physical harassments of civil flights with military crews or military transports.	General Norstad at his discretion authorized to use fighter protection on basis of JCS instructions of 31 August 1961 and JACK PINE II rules of engagement. (See Annex F for JACK PINE rules of engagement.)	Immediate appeal to the United Nations Security Council if fighter protection is introduced.	US-UK agreed position. French position: decision to introduce escorts will be taken by governments.	Ambassadors at Bonn in consultation with the Federal Republic should confirm publicly that in accordance with previous statement [page above] fighter protection has been initiated.
		Take countermeasures in the travel and air traffic fields. (Annex C)	See below under I C.	If there is to be an appeal to the Security Council it is desirable that the Allies' response and countermeasures if any should have been made before the Security Council meets.
			This is the position of the US, France and Germany. The UK will consider at the time. If incident is serious enough to warrant fighter protection, it is Quadripartitely agreed to take these countermeasures.	* NATO has agreed that "in the event of the Soviets enforcing a partial interdiction of NATO air traffic (civil or military) to or from West Berlin, the three measures listed [Annex C] constitute an appropriate response, it being understood that, if this situation arose, the Council would at once meet to decide what action should be taken." NATO also agreed "that the Governments will make without delay the necessary plans to enable them to implement these measures. . . ."

*All except Canada

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<u>C. Shooting or Forcing Down by Military Action of Unescorted Civil or Military Transport.</u>		Protest in Moscow. Immediate appeal to the United Nations Security Council.	Text to be prepared at the time. An automatic approach to the Security Council has been agreed to by the UK and Germany. The French do not wish to make an advance commitment to associate themselves but have no objection to the others proceeding. The US would wish to go at once to the Council if it is understood another government intended to take the issue to the UN. Otherwise, it would want to review the matter in the light of the situation at the time. (Annex)	If there is to be an appeal to the Security Council it is desirable that the Allies' response and countermeasures if any should have been made before the Security Council meets.
		Economic Countermeasures. (Annex C)	Annex C is agreed to Quadripartitely as a minimum for these circumstances.	The US, France and Germany consider that the Annex C countermeasures should be taken at an earlier stage, and it is quadripartitely agreed they should be taken earlier at any time fighter protection is provided. If this had been done, the US, France and Germany would wish to take more severe countermeasures at this time.
		More severe countermeasures (Selected from Annexes A and B).	US, France and Germany agree; the UK will consider at the time.	Germany believes that an appropriate response to an aggressive act such as this should be retaliation possibly in connection with maritime control measures.
				NATO has agreed that "in the event of the Soviets enforcing

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p><u>C. Shooting or Forcing Down by Military Action of Unescorted Civil or Military Transport.</u></p>		<p>Protest in Moscow. Immediate appeal to the United Nations Security Council.</p>	<p>Text to be prepared at the time. An automatic approach to the Security Council has been agreed to by the UK and Germany. The French do not wish to make an advance commitment to associate themselves but have no objection to the others proceeding. The US would wish to go at once to the Council if it is understood another government intended to take the issue to the UN. Otherwise, it would want to review the matter in the light of the situation at the time. (Annex)</p>	<p>If there is to be an appeal to the Security Council it is desirable that the Allies' response and countermeasures if any should have been made before the Security Council meets.</p>
		<p>Economic Countermeasures. (Annex C)</p>	<p>Annex C is agreed to Quadripartitely as a minimum for these circumstances.</p>	<p>The US, France and Germany consider that the Annex C countermeasures should be taken at an earlier stage, and it is quadripartitely agreed they should be taken earlier at any time fighter protection is provided. If this had been done, the US, France and Germany would wish to take more severe countermeasures at this time.</p>
		<p>More severe countermeasures (Selected from Annexes A and B).</p>	<p>US, France and Germany agree; the UK will consider at the time.</p>	<p>Germany believes that an appropriate response to an aggressive act such as this should be retaliation possibly in connection with maritime control measures.</p>
				<p>NATO has agreed that "in the event of the Soviets enforcing</p>

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

C. (Continued)

If in these circumstances General Norstad considers it inappropriate to continue civil flights with military crews in B 1 above, shift to military transport on a tripartite basis. General Norstad at his discretion may initiate fighter protection on the basis of the JCS instructions of 31 August 1961 and the JACK PINE II rules of engagement. First flight may be unescorted and without passengers. Before flights started, three governments through their Ambassadors at Bonn would issue appropriate public statement in consultation with the Federal Government to effect that airlift will continue and necessary measures will continue to be taken to protect transports

Agreed by US-UK.

French position: Shift to military transports should be announced by three governments which would point out that military flights will be escorted, if there are obstacles to their passage and that there will be a reply in case of attack. The actual decision to introduce escorts will be taken by governments. French position "governing principles": 1. Legitimate defense can be envisaged only in the case of an aircraft which, when attacked in the air, is able to defend itself; this is the individual reply to an attack which is normally admitted. 2. Response in the air should of course be prepared, but such response

a partial interdiction of NATO air traffic (civil or military) to or from West Berlin, the three measures listed [Annex C] constitute an appropriate response, it being understood that, if this situation arose, the Council would at once meet to decide what action should be taken." NATO also agreed "that the Governments will make without delay the necessary plans to enable them to implement these measures. . . ."

The question of expanding the rules of engagement of JACK PINE II is under consideration. The decision of the three Governments on action awaits General Norstad's elaboration of the measures he is contemplating and his proposed instructions in this regard.

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

C. (Continued)

If in these circumstances General Norstad considers it inappropriate to continue civil flights with military crews in B 1 above, shift to military transport on a tripartite basis. General Norstad at his discretion may initiate fighter protection on the basis of the JCS instructions of 31 August 1961 and the JACK PINE II rules of engagement. First flight may be unescorted and without passengers. Before flights started, three governments through their Ambassadors at Bonn would issue appropriate public statement in consultation with the Federal Government to effect that airlift will continue and necessary measures will continue to be taken to protect transports

Agreed by US-UK.

French position: Shift to military transports should be announced by three governments which would point out that military flights will be escorted if there are obstacles to their passage and that there will be a reply in case of attack. The actual decision to introduce escorts will be taken by governments. French position "governing principles": 1. Legitimate defense can be envisaged only in the case of an aircraft which, when attacked in the air, is able to defend itself; this is the individual reply to an attack which is normally admitted. 2. Response in the air should of course be prepared, but such response

a partial interdiction of NATO air traffic (civil or military) to or from West Berlin, the three measures listed [Annex C] constitute an appropriate response, it being understood that, if this situation arose, the Council would at once meet to decide what action should be taken." NATO also agreed "that the Governments will make without delay the necessary plans to enable them to implement these measures. . . ."

The question of expanding the rules of engagement of JACK PINE II is under consideration. The decision of the three Governments on action awaits General Norstad's elaboration of the measures he is contemplating and his proposed instructions in this regard.

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

C. (Continued)

(BQD M9). (See Annex F
for Jack Pine rules of
engagement.)could actually take place
only after agreement be-
tween the governments con-
cerned.D. Interference with
escorted transport.1. Attack upon
an escorted aircraft by
other aircraft.See Annex F for JACK PINE
II rules of engagement.

Protest in Moscow.

The question will already
have been brought to the
Security Council and certain
countermeasures will already
be in effect (as a result of
the situation which has
brought about the introduc-
tion of fighter escorts).Text to be prepared at the
time.The rules of engagement are
tripartitely agreed.The question of expanding the
rules of engagement of JACK PINE
II is under consideration. The
decision of the three Governments
on action awaits General Nor-
stad's elaboration of the meas-
ures he is contemplating and his
proposed instructions in this
regard.A situation such as this
suggests the use of a num-
ber of relatively severe
countermeasures at once fol-
lowing the attack (selected
from Annexes A and B). There-
after, as the situation de-
veloped, other and increas-
ingly severe measures (se-
lected from Annex B) could
be taken if attacks persisted
or the Soviet attitude made
it clear that continued such
harassment was to be expected.This general program of
countermeasures would have
to be considered by Gov-
ernments at the time.A determined attack upon an es-
corted aircraft, whether or not
it was successful, would almost
certainly discourage passenger
travel to the degree that it
would, to all practical purposes,
cease. It is conceivable that
an attack could seem unplanned
or even accidental, though this
is improbable, but Allied reac-
tion would depend to some extent
on the assessment of Soviet/GDR
intentions.A particular contingency which
should be recognized as of sig-
nificance is the possible pro-
longed interdiction of passen-
ger traffic, while supply flights
continue. This could result from
even widely-spaced sporadic

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

C. (Continued)

(BQD M9). (See Annex F
for Jack Pine rules of
engagement.)could actually take place
only after agreement be-
tween the governments con-
cerned.D. Interference with
escorted transport.1. Attack upon
an escorted aircraft by
other aircraft.See Annex F for JACK PINE
II rules of engagement.

Protest in Moscow.

The question will already
have been brought to the
Security Council and certain
countermeasures will already
be in effect (as a result of
the situation which has
brought about the introduc-
tion of fighter escorts).Text to be prepared at the
time.The rules of engagement are
tripartitely agreed.The question of expanding the
rules of engagement of JACK PINE
II is under consideration. The
decision of the three Governments
on action awaits General Nor-
stad's elaboration of the meas-
ures he is contemplating and his
proposed instructions in this
regard.A situation such as this
suggests the use of a num-
ber of relatively severe
countermeasures at once fol-
lowing the attack (selected
from Annexes A and B). There-
after, as the situation de-
veloped, other and increas-
ingly severe measures (se-
lected from Annex B) could
be taken if attacks persisted
or the Soviet attitude made
it clear that continued such
harassment was to be expected.This general program of
countermeasures would have
to be considered by Gov-
ernments at the time.A determined attack upon an es-
corted aircraft, whether or not
it was successful, would almost
certainly discourage passenger
travel to the degree that it
would, to all practical purposes,
cease. It is conceivable that
an attack could seem unplanned
or even accidental, though this
is improbable, but Allied reac-
tion would depend to some extent
on the assessment of Soviet/GDR
intentions.A particular contingency which
should be recognized as of sig-
nificance is the possible pro-
longed interdiction of passen-
ger traffic, while supply flights
continue. This could result from
even widely-spaced sporadic

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

2. Attack upon an escorted aircraft by ground fire, or the use of ground obstacles.

Destroy barrage balloons within the corridors or the Berlin Control Zone which are endangering safety of flight. (BQD M9 covers the question of announcements.)

Protest in BASC (as is customary procedure for cases of interference with flight safety).

US and UK agree General Norstad should have discretion to destroy barrage balloons.

French position: In the case of balloons which might be flown around Berlin to block our airports they might have to be destroyed but this would be done only after government decision and announcement.

Consideration will have to be given to returning to the UN.

Regarding the UN much will depend on the status of the issue there following the earlier appeal. The decision will have to be made by Governments at the time.

attacks on transports or even from threats to destroy aircraft carrying passengers. Thus the Soviets would have achieved their often-stated desire to prevent carrying of civilian passengers on Allied aircraft. Germany would wish to have severe countermeasures in this situation.

It is very possible that air-to-air or air-to-ground conflicts would expand beyond the levels provided for in this report. This would be encompassed in planning by LIVE OAK and NATO for larger-scale military operations.

Though it is less likely, the same attack could be made on unescorted aircraft as well. In this case the countermeasures listed under I B 3--physical harassment--or I C--shooting or forcing down of a transport--would apply.

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

2. Attack upon an escorted aircraft by ground fire, or the use of ground obstacles.

Destroy barrage balloons within the corridors or the Berlin Control Zone which are endangering safety of flight. (BQD M9 covers the question of announcements.)

Protest in BASC (as is customary procedure for cases of interference with flight safety).

US and UK agree General Norstad should have discretion to destroy barrage balloons.

French position: In the case of balloons which might be flown around Berlin to block our airports they might have to be destroyed but this would be done only after government decision and announcement.

Consideration will have to be given to returning to the UN.

Regarding the UN much will depend on the status of the issue there following the earlier appeal. The decision will have to be made by Governments at the time.

attacks on transports or even from threats to destroy aircraft carrying passengers. Thus the Soviets would have achieved their often-stated desire to prevent carrying of civilian passengers on Allied aircraft. Germany would wish to have severe countermeasures in this situation.

It is very possible that air-to-air or air-to-ground conflicts would expand beyond the levels provided for in this report. This would be encompassed in planning by LIVE OAK and NATO for larger-scale military operations.

Though it is less likely, the same attack could be made on unescorted aircraft as well. In this case the countermeasures listed under I B 3--physical harassment--or I C--shooting or forcing down of a transport--would apply.

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

Destroy other obstacles within the corridors or the Berlin Control Zone which are endangering safety of flight. (BQD M9 covers the question of announcements.)

Attack those ground targets, excluding airfields, in or immediately adjacent to the air corridors which can be specifically identified in the act of firing at Allied aircraft. (BQD M9 covers the question of announcements.)

Protest in BASC (as is customary procedure for cases of interference with flight safety).

The decision of the Three Governments on action awaits General Norstad's elaboration of the measures he is contemplating and his proposed instructions in this regard.

In the case of ground-to-air attack against air transports or fighters, no decision has yet been made to take this action. General Norstad has been requested to elaborate on the measures he is contemplating before formalizing his plans.

French position "governing principles": 1. Legitimate defense can be envisaged only in the case of an aircraft which, when attacked in the air, is able to defend itself; this is the individual reply to an attack which is normally admitted. 2. Response against the ground should of course be prepared, but such response could actually take place only after agreement between the governments concerned.

The question will already have been brought to the Security Council and certain countermeasures will already be in effect (as a result of the situation which has brought about the introduction of fighter escorts).

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

Destroy other obstacles within the corridors or the Berlin Control Zone which are endangering safety of flight. (BQD M9 covers the question of announcements.)

Attack those ground targets, excluding airfields, in or immediately adjacent to the air corridors which can be specifically identified in the act of firing at Allied aircraft. (BQD M9 covers the question of announcements.)

Protest in BASC (as is customary procedure for cases of interference with flight safety).

The decision of the Three Governments on action awaits General Norstad's elaboration of the measures he is contemplating and his proposed instructions in this regard.

In the case of ground-to-air attack against air transports or fighters, no decision has yet been made to take this action. General Norstad has been requested to elaborate on the measures he is contemplating before formalizing his plans.

French position "governing principles": 1. Legitimate defense can be envisaged only in the case of an aircraft which, when attacked in the air, is able to defend itself; this is the individual reply to an attack which is normally admitted. 2. Response against the ground should of course be prepared, but such response could actually take place only after agreement between the governments concerned.

The question will already have been brought to the Security Council and certain countermeasures will already be in effect (as a result of the situation which has brought about the introduction of fighter escorts).

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
		<p>A situation such as this suggests the use of a number of relatively severe countermeasures at once following the attack (selected from Annexes A and B). Thereafter, as the situation developed, other and increasingly severe measures (selected from Annex B) could be taken if attacks persisted or the Soviet attitude made it clear that continued such harassment was to be expected.</p>	<p>This general program of countermeasures would have to be considered by Governments at the time.</p>	<p>A determined attack upon an escorted aircraft, whether or not it was successful, would almost certainly discourage passenger travel to the degree that it would, to all practical purposes, cease. It is conceivable that an attack could seem unplanned or even accidental, though this is improbable, but Allied reaction would depend to some extent on the assessment of Soviet/GDR intentions.</p> <p>A particular contingency which should be recognized as of significance is the possible prolonged interdiction of passenger traffic, while supply flights continue. This could result from even widely-spaced sporadic attacks on transports or even from threats to destroy aircraft carrying passengers. Thus the Soviets would have achieved their often-stated desire to prevent carrying of civilian passengers on Allied aircraft. Germany would wish to have severe countermeasures taken in this situation.</p>
		<p>Consideration will have to be given to returning to the UN.</p>	<p>Regarding the UN much will depend on the status of the issue there following the earlier appeal. The decision will have to be made by Governments at the time.</p>	<p>It is very possible that air-to-air or air-to-ground conflicts</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
		<p>A situation such as this suggests the use of a number of relatively severe countermeasures at once following the attack (selected from Annexes A and B). Thereafter, as the situation developed, other and increasingly severe measures (selected from Annex B) could be taken if attacks persisted or the Soviet attitude made it clear that continued such harassment was to be expected.</p>	<p>This general program of countermeasures would have to be considered by Governments at the time.</p>	<p>A determined attack upon an escorted aircraft, whether or not it was successful, would almost certainly discourage passenger travel to the degree that it would, to all practical purposes, cease. It is conceivable that an attack could seem unplanned or even accidental, though this is improbable, but Allied reaction would depend to some extent on the assessment of Soviet/GDR intentions.</p>
		<p>Consideration will have to be given to returning to the UN.</p>	<p>Regarding the UN much will depend on the status of the issue there following the earlier appeal. The decision will have to be made by Governments at the time.</p>	<p>A particular contingency which should be recognized as of significance is the possible prolonged interdiction of passenger traffic, while supply flights continue. This could result from even widely-spaced sporadic attacks on transports or even from threats to destroy aircraft carrying passengers. Thus the Soviets would have achieved their often-stated desire to prevent carrying of civilian passengers on Allied aircraft. Germany would wish to have severe countermeasures taken in this situation.</p>
				<p>It is very possible that air-to-air or air-to-ground conflicts</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p>E. <u>All-out attempt to halt air transport (ground access still being open).</u></p>	<p>In case one, the responses listed for items C and D above would be intensified as appropriate.</p>	<p>In case one, countermeasures listed for items C and D above would be intensified (see item below on economic embargo).</p>	<p>US and UK consider General Norstad has discretion (see page 3).</p>	<p>would expand beyond the levels provided for in the JACK PINE II plans. This would be encompassed in planning by LIVE OAK and NATO for larger-scale military operations.</p>
<p>This could occur in two principal ways.</p>	<p>In case two, the following special measures would be taken:</p>		<p>General Norstad does not have explicit authorization to provide fighter protection in this contingency; Governments are considering giving him such discretion. (He now has discretion, according to the US and UK, to use fighter protection on the basis of JCS instructions of 31 August 1961 and JACK PINE rules of engagement, if a military or civil plane is forced down by</p>	<p>Hitherto decisions have been sought for contingencies in which Soviets acted against Western planes; the case of a Soviet announcement of such action has not been dealt with. (The question of expanding JACK PINE rules of engagement is under consideration.)</p>
<p>1. Intensified interference with or harassment of civil flights with military crews or military transports amounting substantially to halting of air access.</p>	<p>(i) Presumably civil airlines, if they are flying, will cease to fly;</p>			
<p>2. A Soviet or GDR announcement prohibiting flights on one basis or another.</p>	<p>(ii) Probe flights without passengers;</p>			
	<p>(iii) Fighter protection would be provided the probes on basis of JCS instructions of 31 August 1961 and JACK PINE II rules of engagement (see Annex F for JACK PINE rules of engagement).</p>			

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p>E. <u>All-out attempt to halt air transport (ground access still being open).</u></p> <p>This could occur in two principal ways.</p> <p>1. Intensified interference with or harassment of civil flights with military crews or military transports amounting substantially to halting of air access.</p> <p>2. A Soviet or GDR announcement prohibiting flights on one basis or another.</p>	<p>In case one, the responses listed for items C and D above would be intensified as appropriate.</p> <p>In case two, the following special measures would be taken:</p> <p>(i) Presumably civil airlines, if they are flying, will cease to fly;</p> <p>(ii) Probe flights without passengers;</p> <p>(iii) Fighter protection would be provided the probes on basis of JCS instructions of 31 August 1961 and JACK PINE II rules of engagement (see Annex F for JACK PINE rules of engagement).</p>	<p>In case one, countermeasures listed for items C and D above would be intensified (see item below on economic embargo).</p>	<p>US and UK consider General Norstad has discretion (see page 3).</p> <p>General Norstad does not have explicit authorization to provide fighter protection in this contingency; Governments are considering giving him such discretion. (He now has discretion, according to the US and UK, to use fighter protection on the basis of JCS instructions of 31 August 1961 and JACK PINE rules of engagement, if a military or civil plane is forced down by</p>	<p>would expand beyond the levels provided for in the JACK PINE II plans. This would be encompassed in planning by LIVE OAK and NATO for larger-scale military operations.</p> <p>Hitherto decisions have been sought for contingencies in which Soviets acted against Western planes; the case of a Soviet announcement of such action has not been dealt with. (The question of expanding JACK PINE rules of engagement is under consideration.)</p>

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

(iv) Should these probes show that the GDR/Soviets are determined to interdict Allied air access a decision will be required on implementing planning for expanded air operations.

(v) Should blockage of air access continue even after initiation of additional or expanded air operations, even farther-reaching military operations will have to be considered.

If this is the first instance of physical interference, we would not yet have gone to the UN on this matter. Approach to the Security Council at least would thus take place.

In either case one or two the following would apply:

military action or is shot down. French reserve government decision to the time.)

LIVE OAK and NATO are preparing plans for larger-scale military operations.

Same as above.

An automatic approach to the Security Council has been agreed to by the UK and Germany. The French do not wish to make an advance commitment to associate themselves but have no objection to the others proceeding. The US would wish to go at once to the Council if it were understood another government intended to take the issue to the UN. Otherwise it would want to review the matter in the light of the situation at the time.

If there is to be an appeal to the Security Council it is desirable that the Allied response and countermeasures if any, should have been made before the Security Council meets.

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

(iv) Should these probes show that the GDR/Soviets are determined to interdict Allied air access a decision will be required on implementing planning for expanded air operations.

(v) Should blockage of air access continue even after initiation of additional or expanded air operations, even farther-reaching military operations will have to be considered.

If this is the first instance of physical interference, we would not yet have gone to the UN on this matter. Approach to the Security Council at least would thus take place.

In either case one or two the following would apply:

military action or is shot down. French reserve government decision to the time.)

LIVE OAK and NATO are preparing plans for larger-scale military operations.

Same as above.

An automatic approach to the Security Council has been agreed to by the UK and Germany. The French do not wish to make an advance commitment to associate themselves but have no objection to the others proceeding. The US would wish to go at once to the Council if it were understood another government intended to take the issue to the UN. Otherwise it would want to review the matter in the light of the situation at the time.

If there is to be an appeal to the Security Council it is desirable that the Allied response and countermeasures if any, should have been made before the Security Council meets.

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

If an earlier incident had caused the matter to be taken to the Security Council, the question would arise whether to return to that body, go to the General Assembly or not return to the UN at all. This would depend to an extent on the outcome of the earlier approach.

Severe military, political, economic, and psychological countermeasures from Annex A and B would be taken, including countermeasures amounting to a total economic embargo against the Soviet Bloc.

The question of approaches to the UN subsequent to an initial approach has not been examined in detail. Since so much would depend on the outcome of the initial approach, a precise advance decision would appear not to be practicable.

Decisions on military, political and psychological countermeasures will be required. Economic countermeasures amounting to an economic embargo against the Soviet Bloc were agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in August 1961. The NATO Council is considering a resolution which provides along the lines that, upon determination by NATO member Governments that substantially complete blockage has occurred, they will take measures amounting to an economic embargo.

The Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in August 1961 agreed that economic countermeasures represent an integral part of the overall Allied policy for meeting the threat to West Berlin. These countermeasures cannot substitute for military, political, and psychological actions, but can serve as an effective auxiliary to such actions.

The UK envisages that the most severe economic countermeasures would be taken at the moment of final crisis in connection with the most severe military, political and psychological countermeasures.

It is very possible that air-to-air or air-to-ground conflicts would expand beyond the levels provided for in the JACK PINE II plan. This would be encompassed in planning by LIVE OAK and NATO for larger-scale military operations.

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

If an earlier incident had caused the matter to be taken to the Security Council, the question would arise whether to return to that body, go to the General Assembly or not return to the UN at all. This would depend to an extent on the outcome of the earlier approach.

Severe military, political, economic, and psychological countermeasures from Annex A and B would be taken, including countermeasures amounting to a total economic embargo against the Soviet Bloc.

The question of approaches to the UN subsequent to an initial approach has not been examined in detail. Since so much would depend on the outcome of the initial approach, a precise advance decision would appear not to be practicable.

Decisions on military, political and psychological countermeasures will be required. Economic countermeasures amounting to an economic embargo against the Soviet Bloc were agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in August 1961. The NATO Council is considering a resolution which provides along the lines that, upon determination by NATO member Governments that substantially complete blockage has occurred, they will take measures amounting to an economic embargo.

The Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in August 1961 agreed that economic countermeasures represent an integral part of the overall Allied policy for meeting the threat to West Berlin. These countermeasures cannot substitute for military, political, and psychological actions, but can serve as an effective auxiliary to such actions.

The UK envisages that the most severe economic countermeasures would be taken at the moment of final crisis in connection with the most severe military, political and psychological countermeasures.

It is very possible that air-to-air or air-to-ground conflicts would expand beyond the levels provided for in the JACK PINE II plan. This would be encompassed in planning by LIVE OAK and NATO for larger-scale military operations.

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

F. Determined efforts to interdict Allied air transport, of all categories, ground access being closed.

Depending on the length of time land access has been blocked, the situation may well already be close to active military engagement. Countermeasures will have been applied which will in any case be severe and might be approaching the most severe available. It is also likely that earlier friction in the air corridors will have brought about considerable military activity in the air. The principal effect of this contingency will be to precipitate the use of severe countermeasures not already employed and the use of military action (to the extent feasible given the state of build-up and deployment) if other means fail.

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

F. Determined efforts to interdict Allied air transport, of all categories, ground access being closed.

Depending on the length of time land access has been blocked, the situation may well already be close to active military engagement. Countermeasures will have been applied which will in any case be severe and might be approaching the most severe available. It is also likely that earlier friction in the air corridors will have brought about considerable military activity in the air. The principal effect of this contingency will be to precipitate the use of severe countermeasures not already employed and the use of military action (to the extent feasible given the state of build-up and deployment) if other means fail.

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
II. INTERFERENCE WITH GROUND ACCESS TO BERLIN.				
A. <u>Interference with Allied traffic, but not German civilian traffic, by Soviets or by GDR.</u>				
1. Harassments short of blockage.				
a. Administrative slowdown of processing of road and rail traffic, including delays in routing trains through the GDR.	Depends on specific form of harassment.	Protest to Karlshorst or Soviet Government, depending on gravity.	Final decision on Allied reaction will have to be made at the time by Governments or, in the case of minor harassments in Bonn in consultation with the Federal Government given the importance of the context in which the harassment occurs. However, the responses and countermeasures are in principle agreed quadripartitely, subject to this condition.	Responses and countermeasures for A 1 a and b assume harassment does not reach serious proportions; those for A 1 c, d and e assume Allied transit is permitted without the Allies acceding to the demands. Many of such harassments have been experienced over the years at the hands of the Soviets. They will have a more serious implication, however, if they are applied by the GDR after turnover of East Germans of checkpoints. In the latter event, they would likely be the beginning of a rising scale of harassments looking to control of allied movement. If demands such as those in this section are pressed, they would constitute blockage through institution of unacceptable controls (see Section II A 2). Because of the political significance of a peace treaty, responses and countermeasures will be affected by the question whether such a treaty has
b. Harassment of Allied autobahn travelers by East German police.	Refuse to deal with police; demand to see Soviet Officer.	Same as above. Also maintain some form of autobahn patrol.	Same as above.	
c. Demands for payment of road tolls (such as West Germans now pay).	Refuse to pay tolls.	Same as above.	Same as above.	
d. Demand to search or exercise other controls over vehicles.	Refuse to permit search or other such controls.	Same as above.	Same as above.	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
II. INTERFERENCE WITH GROUND ACCESS TO BERLIN.				
A. <u>Interference with Allied traffic, but not German civilian traffic, by Soviets or by GDR.</u>				
1. Harassments short of blockage.				
a. Administrative slowdown of processing of road and rail traffic, including delays in routing trains through the GDR.	Depends on specific form of harassment.	Protest to Karlshorst or Soviet Government, depending on gravity.	Final decision on Allied reaction will have to be made at the time by Governments or, in the case of minor harassments in Bonn in consultation with the Federal Government given the importance of the context in which the harassment occurs. However, the responses and countermeasures are in principle agreed quadripartitely, subject to this condition.	Responses and countermeasures for A 1 a and b assume harassment does not reach serious proportions; those for A 1 c, d and e assume Allied transit is permitted without the Allies acceding to the demands. Many of such harassments have been experienced over the years at the hands of the Soviets. They will have a more serious implication, however, if they are applied by the GDR after turnover of East Germans of checkpoints. In the latter event, they would likely be the beginning of a rising scale of harassments looking to control of allied movement. If demands such as those in this section are pressed, they would constitute blockage through institution of unacceptable controls (see Section II A 2). Because of the political significance of a peace treaty, responses and countermeasures will be affected by the question whether such a treaty has
b. Harassment of Allied autobahn travelers by East German police.	Refuse to deal with police; demand to see Soviet Officer.	Same as above. Also maintain some form of autobahn patrol.	Same as above.	
c. Demands for payment of road tolls (such as West Germans now pay).	Refuse to pay tolls.	Same as above.	Same as above.	
d. Demand to search or exercise other controls over vehicles.	Refuse to permit search or other such controls.	Same as above.	Same as above.	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p>e. Impose "safety" or other regulations on highways or railroads requiring vehicles or trains to meet particular "standards," to be registered, etc.</p>	<p>Refuse to comply, on the grounds that vehicles are not subject to Soviet or GDR control.</p>	<p>Same as above.</p>	<p>Same as above.</p>	<p>been signed by the time the harassment occurs. Severe countermeasures would expose us to the risk of complete blockage of Allied access, but the lack of them might mislead the Soviets into believing the Allies are not serious about defending their publicly announced vital interests. It is within the power of the Soviets and the GDR to make transit so difficult as to be of little value.</p>
<p>f. Persistent harassment over a period of time severely hampering Allied access.</p>		<p>Protest on appropriate occasions. Apply countermeasures selected from the following: numbers 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 22, 23, and 24 of Annex A.</p>	<p>Final decision on specific Allied reaction will have to be made at the time by Governments. Too much depends upon the exact nature of the harassment to permit advance decision. With this qualification, the countermeasures are in principle agreed by the US, France and Germany. The UK agrees the listed countermeasures would be appropriate if any were to be used, but reserves the decision as to the use of countermeasures <u>per se</u> to the time. The US, France and Germany consider that in general the countermeasures should be applied initially against the entire Soviet Bloc. The UK proposes they should be applied initially against the GDR alone except in cases where the other members of the bloc have associated themselves with the harassment in question.</p>	
	<p>At such time as the harassment becomes severe we might wish to resort to a partial garrison airlift.</p>		<p>Garrison airlift plans are prepared and agreed tripartitely.</p>	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p>e. Impose "safety" or other regulations on highways or railroads requiring vehicles or trains to meet particular "standards," to be registered, etc.</p>	<p>Refuse to comply, on the grounds that vehicles are not subject to Soviet or GDR control.</p>	<p>Same as above.</p>	<p>Same as above.</p>	<p>been signed by the time the harassment occurs. Severe countermeasures would expose us to the risk of complete blockage of Allied access, but the lack of them might mislead the Soviets into believing the Allies are not serious about defending their publicly announced vital interests. It is within the power of the Soviets and the GDR to make transit so difficult as to be of little value.</p>
<p>f. Persistent harassment over a period of time severely hampering Allied access.</p>		<p>Protest on appropriate occasions. Apply countermeasures selected from the following: numbers 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 22, 23, and 24 of Annex A.</p>	<p>Final decision on specific Allied reaction will have to be made at the time by Governments. Too much depends upon the exact nature of the harassment to permit advance decision. With this qualification, the countermeasures are in principle agreed by the US, France and Germany. The UK agrees the listed countermeasures would be appropriate if any were to be used, but reserves the decision as to the use of countermeasures <u>per se</u> to the time. The US, France and Germany consider that in general the countermeasures should be applied initially against the entire Soviet Bloc. The UK proposes they should be applied initially against the GDR alone except in cases where the other members of the bloc have associated themselves with the harassment in question.</p>	
	<p>At such time as the harassment becomes severe we might wish to resort to a partial garrison airlift.</p>		<p>Garrison airlift plans are prepared and agreed tripartitely.</p>	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p>2. Blockage of Allied road or rail access through introduction of unacceptable controls by the Soviets or GDR, air access being still open. (Unacceptable controls would be any conditions placed on transit beyond those already existing. Under current plans, the carrying out by GDR personnel of procedures now carried out by Soviet personnel would be permitted.) This includes also blockage through severe, persistent harassment.</p>	<p>When the control is announced, a movement should be presented at the checkpoint. If the control is affirmed by the Soviet or GDR personnel, the Allied personnel should insist on their right to pass on basis of earlier procedures. If the demand for control is maintained, the movement should withdraw and report to the Allied military authorities.</p>	<p>Protest as appropriate in circumstances.</p> <p>Economic countermeasures of a degree less than complete embargo should be taken, together with non-economic countermeasures. Particular measures should be drawn from the suggested list prepared for the case of total Allied land blockage (contained in Annex E). The number and severity of measures to be used would depend upon the circumstances.</p>	<p>The initial response was embodied in the revisions of the contingency plan instructions on turnover of checkpoints to the GDR, now approved by Governments. The decision to use particular countermeasures must be made at the time by Governments, since the circumstances may vary widely. With this qualification, however, there is quadripartite agreement that the countermeasures listed in Annex E constitute an appropriate list from which to choose.</p>	<p>It would not be useful to elaborate on the precise nature of the controls which might be introduced by the Soviets or, more likely, the GDR after signing of a peace treaty. There are a great many which could be used.</p>
	<p>If blockage persists, consideration will have to be given to the use of military operations as indicated by the results of the political and other measures being taken.</p>		<p>A decision will have to be taken at the time by Governments (of the Four Powers or NATO as appropriate) to implement military plans. Planning is underway by Governments, LIVE OAK and major NATO commands regarding nature and timing of military action. In addition to the Free Style probe, a plan for an operation by a reinforced battalion (Trade Wind) is agreed tripartitely; logistic</p>	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p>2. Blockage of Allied road or rail access through introduction of unacceptable controls by the Soviets or GDR, air access being still open. (Unacceptable controls would be any conditions placed on transit beyond those already existing. Under current plans, the carrying out by GDR personnel of procedures now carried out by Soviet personnel would be permitted.) This includes also blockage through severe, persistent harassment.</p>	<p>When the control is announced, a movement should be presented at the checkpoint. If the control is affirmed by the Soviet or GDR personnel, the Allied personnel should insist on their right to pass on basis of earlier procedures. If the demand for control is maintained, the movement should withdraw and report to the Allied military authorities.</p>	<p>Protest as appropriate in circumstances.</p> <p>Economic countermeasures of a degree less than complete embargo should be taken, together with non-economic countermeasures. Particular measures should be drawn from the suggested list prepared for the case of total Allied land blockage (contained in Annex E). The number and severity of measures to be used would depend upon the circumstances.</p>	<p>The initial response was embodied in the revisions of the contingency plan instructions on turnover of checkpoints to the GDR, now approved by Governments. The decision to use particular countermeasures must be made at the time by Governments, since the circumstances may vary widely. With this qualification, however, there is quadripartite agreement that the countermeasures listed in Annex E constitute an appropriate list from which to choose.</p>	<p>It would not be useful to elaborate on the precise nature of the controls which might be introduced by the Soviets or, more likely, the GDR after signing of a peace treaty. There are a great many which could be used.</p>
	<p>If blockage persists, consideration will have to be given to the use of military operations as indicated by the results of the political and other measures being taken.</p>		<p>A decision will have to be taken at the time by Governments (of the Four Powers or NATO as appropriate) to implement military plans. Planning is underway by Governments, LIVE OAK and major NATO commands regarding nature and timing of military action. In addition to the Free Style probe, a plan for an operation by a reinforced battalion (Trade Wind) is agreed tripartitely; logistic</p>	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
			<p>and organizational planning for a division-sized operation (June Ball) is in preparation. Major NATO military commanders have been given the following instructions by the NATO members: For the purpose of providing as great a choice as possible of supplementary alternatives, NATO military plans covering broad land, air or naval measures should be prepared by the major NATO Commanders as appropriate. In each case, the expected advantages and estimated risks should be set out in specific terms to accompany plans. In particular, plans to provide for the following should be studied urgently:</p> <p>(a) Appropriate alert measures for NATO forces prior to initiation of any tripartite military measures; (b) expanded non-nuclear air and/or naval operations; (c) expanded non-nuclear ground operations with necessary air support; (d) selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them. (Approved NATO October 17)</p>	
		<p>Possible approach to the Security Council, depending on the circumstances.</p>	<p>The question of approaching the UN at this stage should be decided at the time by Governments.</p>	<p>If there is to be an appeal to the Security Council it is desirable that the Allied response and countermeasures, if any,</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
			<p>and organizational planning for a division-sized operation (June Ball) is in preparation. Major NATO military commanders have been given the following instructions by the NATO members: For the purpose of providing as great a choice as possible of supplementary alternatives, NATO military plans covering broad land, air or naval measures should be prepared by the major NATO Commanders as appropriate. In each case, the expected advantages and estimated risks should be set out in specific terms to accompany plans. In particular, plans to provide for the following should be studied urgently:</p> <p>(a) Appropriate alert measures for NATO forces prior to initiation of any tripartite military measures; (b) expanded non-nuclear air and/or naval operations; (c) expanded non-nuclear ground operations with necessary air support; (d) selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them. (Approved NATO October 17)</p>	
		<p>Possible approach to the Security Council, depending on the circumstances.</p>	<p>The question of approaching the UN at this stage should be decided at the time by Governments.</p>	<p>If there is to be an appeal to the Security Council it is desirable that the Allied response and countermeasures, if any,</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p>3. Blockage of Allied road or rail access by forcible closure of one or more routes, air access being still open. By this is meant the flat refusal of the Soviets or GDR to permit passage over a route.</p>	Same as above.	Same as above.	Same as above.	<p>should have been taken before the Security Council meets.</p> <p>Same as above.</p>
<p>a. Closing of the autobahn or railroad on grounds that repairs are needed. This is a special case with respect to our initial response.</p>	<p>The three Embassies in Bonn in consultation with the German Government, state or authorize the statement that we expect our rights of road or rail access will be met by the provision of another route while repairs are being made.</p>	<p>Offer to repair the road or railroad.</p>	<p>The special response should be agreed to in advance as appropriate for this contingency. It is being considered quadripartitely to this end.</p>	
<p>4. Blockage of Allied road <u>and</u> rail access by any means, air access being open.</p>	<p>When the unacceptable control or the prohibition on use of the access routes is announced (depending on the nature of the closure) a movement should be presented at the checkpoint. If the situation is confirmed, the Allied personnel should insist on their right to pass on the basis of previous procedures. If the demand for control or the prohibition is maintained, the</p>	<p>Non-military and military countermeasures as listed in Annex E (drawn from lists at Annexes A and B).</p>	<p>The initial response is analogous to that embodied in the revisions of the contingency plan instructions on turnover of checkpoints to the GDR, now approved by Governments. (BQD-4)</p>	<p>The countermeasures at Annex E are under consideration by French and German Governments. UK position is set forth in the Annex. (Annex E is a US paper and is being circulated as the</p> <p>With respect to Economic Countermeasures, the Report of the Four-Power Working Group on this subject provided that very severe countermeasures would be appropriate if Allied traffic to West Berlin is blocked.</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p>3. Blockage of Allied road or rail access by forcible closure of one or more routes, air access being still open. By this is meant the flat refusal of the Soviets or GDR to permit passage over a route.</p>	Same as above.	Same as above.	Same as above.	<p>should have been taken before the Security Council meets.</p> <p>Same as above.</p>
<p>a. Closing of the autobahn or railroad on grounds that repairs are needed. This is a special case with respect to our initial response.</p>	<p>The three Embassies in Bonn in consultation with the German Government, state or authorize the statement that we expect our rights of road or rail access will be met by the provision of another route while repairs are being made.</p>	<p>Offer to repair the road or railroad.</p>	<p>The special response should be agreed to in advance as appropriate for this contingency. It is being considered quadripartitely to this end.</p>	
<p>4. Blockage of Allied road <u>and</u> rail access by any means, air access being open.</p>	<p>When the unacceptable control or the prohibition on use of the access routes is announced (depending on the nature of the closure) a movement should be presented at the checkpoint. If the situation is confirmed, the Allied personnel should insist on their right to pass on the basis of previous procedures. If the demand for control or the prohibition is maintained, the</p>	<p>Non-military and military countermeasures as listed in Annex E (drawn from lists at Annexes A and B).</p>	<p>The initial response is analogous to that embodied in the revisions of the contingency plan instructions on turnover of checkpoints to the GDR, now approved by Governments. (BQD-4)</p>	<p>The countermeasures at Annex E are under consideration by French and German Governments. UK position is set forth in the Annex. (Annex E is a US paper and is being circulated as the</p> <p>With respect to Economic Countermeasures, the Report of the Four-Power Working Group on this subject provided that very severe countermeasures would be appropriate if Allied traffic to West Berlin is blocked.</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
	<p>movement should withdraw and report to the Allied military authorities.</p>		<p>proposed basis for the making of decisions.) A decision will be required at the time as to the point at which IZT should be involved in countermeasures. The Working Group on Economic Countermeasures noted that the desirability of maintaining German civilian access in this contingency suggests "that it might be desirable to defer the imposition of a total economic embargo [which would include IZT] for a reasonable time on a tactical basis, recognizing that any indefinite toleration of this invasion of Allied rights would be unacceptable."</p>	<p>The Working Group on Economic Countermeasures also recommended as a matter of priority advance planning on an ad referendum basis of the selective countermeasures considered appropriate in this contingency.</p>
	<p>Possible introduction of a garrison airlift.</p>		<p>Garrison airlift plans are complete and are tripartitely approved. A decision will have to be taken at the time to implement them.</p>	
	<p>If blockage persists, consideration will have to be given to the timing of military operations as indicated by the results of political and other measures being taken.</p>		<p>A decision will have to be taken at the time by Governments (of the Four Powers or NATO as appropriate) to implement military plans. Planning is under way by Governments, LIVE OAK and major NATO commands regarding the nature and timing of military action. In addition to the Free Style Probe, a plan for an operation by a</p>	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
	<p>movement should withdraw and report to the Allied military authorities.</p>		<p>proposed basis for the making of decisions.) A decision will be required at the time as to the point at which IZT should be involved in countermeasures. The Working Group on Economic Countermeasures noted that the desirability of maintaining German civilian access in this contingency suggests "that it might be desirable to defer the imposition of a total economic embargo [which would include IZT] for a reasonable time on a tactical basis, recognizing that any indefinite toleration of this invasion of Allied rights would be unacceptable."</p>	<p>The Working Group on Economic Countermeasures also recommended as a matter of priority advance planning on an ad referendum basis of the selective countermeasures considered appropriate in this contingency.</p>
	<p>Possible introduction of a garrison airlift.</p>		<p>Garrison airlift plans are complete and are tripartitely approved. A decision will have to be taken at the time to implement them.</p>	
	<p>If blockage persists, consideration will have to be given to the timing of military operations as indicated by the results of political and other measures being taken.</p>		<p>A decision will have to be taken at the time by Governments (of the Four Powers or NATO as appropriate) to implement military plans. Planning is under way by Governments, LIVE OAK and major NATO commands regarding the nature and timing of military action. In addition to the Free Style Probe, a plan for an operation by a</p>	

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

reinforced battalion (Trade Wind) is agreed tripartitely. Logistic and organizational planning for a division-sized action (June Ball) is in preparation. Major NATO military commanders have been given the following instructions by the NATO members: For the purpose of providing as great a choice as possible of supplementary alternatives, NATO military plans covering broad land, air or naval measures should be prepared by the major NATO Commanders as appropriate. In each case, the expected advantages and estimated risks should be set out in specific terms to accompany plans. In particular, plans to provide for the following should be studied urgently:

- (a) Appropriate alert measures for NATO forces prior to initiation of any tripartite military measures;
- (b) expanded non-nuclear air and/or naval operations;
- (c) expanded non-nuclear ground operations with necessary air support;
- (d) selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them. (Approved NATO October 17)

5. Blockage of Allied road and rail access by any means, air access being closed. If air access, politically the most vital of access routes, had been closed, the Allies would already

Mobilization and alert measures.

A decision by Governments will be required at the time regarding mobilization and alert measures. It is to be expected that the decision to undertake military ground operations will result in cutting off German access.

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
5. Blockage of Allied road and rail access by any means, air access being closed.	If air access, politically the most vital of access routes, had been closed, the Allies would already	Mobilization and alert measures.	A decision by Governments regarding mobilization and alert measures.	It is to be expected that the decision to undertake military ground operations will result in cutting off German access.

reinforced battalion (Trade Wind) is agreed tripartitely. Logistic and organizational planning for a division-sized action (June Ball) is in preparation. Major NATO military commanders have been given the following instructions by the NATO members: For the purpose of providing as great a choice as possible of supplementary alternatives, NATO military plans covering broad land, air or naval measures should be prepared by the major NATO Commanders as appropriate. In each case, the expected advantages and estimated risks should be set out in specific terms to accompany plans. In particular, plans to provide for the following should be studied urgently:

(a) Appropriate alert measures for NATO forces prior to initiation of any tripartite military measures; (b) expanded non-nuclear air and/or naval operations; (c) expanded non-nuclear ground operations with necessary air support; (d) selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them. (Approved NATO October 17)

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
	<p>have begun intensive efforts in the military and non-military fields to reopen it. Closing of Allied ground access would bring about additional military measures and operations.</p>	<p>An economic embargo would be in effect and we would have taken the issue at an earlier stage to the UN Security Council. A further appeal to the UN would have to be considered. Far-reaching and severe countermeasures on a world-wide scale would be intensified. (See Annexes A and B)</p>	<p>In addition, a decision will have to be taken at the time by Governments (of the Four Powers or NATO as appropriate) to implement military plans. Planning is underway by governments, LIVE OAK and major NATO commands regarding the nature and timing of military action. In addition to the Free Style probe, a plan for an operation by a reinforced battalion (Trade Wind) is agreed tripartitely. Logistic and organizational planning for a division-sized action (June Ball) is in preparation. The following instructions have been given to major NATO commanders by NATO members: For the purpose of providing as great a choice as possible of supplementary alternatives, NATO military plans covering broad land, air or naval measures should be prepared by the major NATO Commanders as appropriate. In each case, the expected advantages and estimated risks should be set out in specific terms to accompany plans. In particular, plans to provide for the following should be studied urgently:</p> <p>(a) Appropriate alert measures for NATO forces prior to initiation of any tripartite</p>	<p>(Actually, since the closing of air access would have brought about a complete economic embargo, including cancellation of IZT, it is relatively unlikely that a situation will occur in which air access will be closed but German civilian ground access open.)</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
	<p>have begun intensive efforts in the military and non-military fields to reopen it. Closing of Allied ground access would bring about additional military measures and operations.</p>	<p>An economic embargo would be in effect and we would have taken the issue at an earlier stage to the UN Security Council. A further appeal to the UN would have to be considered. Far-reaching and severe countermeasures on a world-wide scale would be intensified. (See Annexes A and B)</p>	<p>In addition, a decision will have to be taken at the time by Governments (of the Four Powers or NATO as appropriate) to implement military plans. Planning is underway by governments, LIVE OAK and major NATO commands regarding the nature and timing of military action. In addition to the Free Style probe, a plan for an operation by a reinforced battalion (Trade Wind) is agreed tripartitely. Logistic and organizational planning for a division-sized action (June Ball) is in preparation. The following instructions have been given to major NATO commanders by NATO members: For the purpose of providing as great a choice as possible of supplementary alternatives, NATO military plans covering broad land, air or naval measures should be prepared by the major NATO Commanders as appropriate. In each case, the expected advantages and estimated risks should be set out in specific terms to accompany plans. In particular, plans to provide for the following should be studied urgently:</p> <p>(a) Appropriate alert measures for NATO forces prior to initiation of any tripartite</p>	<p>(Actually, since the closing of air access would have brought about a complete economic embargo, including cancellation of IZT, it is relatively unlikely that a situation will occur in which air access will be closed but German civilian ground access open.)</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
			<p>military measures; (b) expanded non-nuclear air and/or naval operations; (c) expanded non-nuclear ground operations with necessary air support; (d) selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them. (Approved NATO Oct. 17)</p> <p>Decisions will be required at the time by Governments concerning far-reaching and severe countermeasures to be applied prior to and/or concurrently with the military action. It is not possible to foresee the circumstances at this advanced stage sufficiently to select particular countermeasures in advance.</p>	
		<p>Possible further action in the UN.</p>	<p>A decision will be required at the time by Governments regarding further action in the UN.</p>	<p>It is to be expected that as armed conflict became imminent another country will take the question to the UN if we do not.</p>
<p><u>B. Interference with German but not Allied ground access.</u></p>				
<p>1. Harassments short of blockage. There are a great many measures the GDR can take in this field. Their effect is to make traffic to Berlin</p>	<p>The responses will depend upon the harassment. In general they will have the purpose of rejecting vigorously any increase in control over German traffic and securing passage for</p>	<p>Protest statement by German Government on each occasion of significant harassment. Protest by the Three Powers to the Soviets at an appropriate level.</p>	<p>The protest would be for decision by the German Government. Decision by the Three Ambassadors at Bonn. A specific use of IZT would be for decision by the</p>	<p>The Working Group report submitted to the Ministers at Paris in August 1961 stated, "Should the Soviet-occupied zone substantially interfere with Berlin traffic (German traffic) then this would be</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
			<p>military measures; (b) expanded non-nuclear air and/or naval operations; (c) expanded non-nuclear ground operations with necessary air support; (d) selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them. (Approved NATO Oct. 17)</p> <p>Decisions will be required at the time by Governments concerning far-reaching and severe countermeasures to be applied prior to and/or concurrently with the military action. It is not possible to foresee the circumstances at this advanced stage sufficiently to select particular countermeasures in advance.</p>	
		<p>Possible further action in the UN.</p>	<p>A decision will be required at the time by Governments regarding further action in the UN.</p>	<p>It is to be expected that as armed conflict became imminent another country will take the question to the UN if we do not.</p>
<p><u>B. Interference with German but not Allied ground access.</u></p>				
<p>1. Harassments short of blockage. There are a great many measures the GDR can take in this field. Their effect is to make traffic to Berlin</p>	<p>The responses will depend upon the harassment. In general they will have the purpose of rejecting vigorously any increase in control over German traffic and securing passage for</p>	<p>Protest statement by German Government on each occasion of significant harassment. Protest by the Three Powers to the Soviets at an appropriate level.</p>	<p>The protest would be for decision by the German Government. Decision by the Three Ambassadors at Bonn. A specific use of IZT would be for decision by the</p>	<p>The Working Group report submitted to the Ministers at Paris in August 1961 stated, "Should the Soviet-occupied zone substantially interfere with Berlin traffic (German traffic) then this would be</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
expensive, difficult and uncertain.	the transport being interfered with. (The German delegation has suggested to its Government the preparation of a paper on German traffic to be annexed to this report.)	<p>While the IZT agreement should not be involved substantially for such measures, it would be well for the link between interzonal trade and access to Berlin to be emphasized by some limited trade retaliation, commensurate in severity with the severity of harassment. (Re IZT, see Annex D)</p> <p>Selective Allied countermeasures would be applied concurrently with countermeasures under IZT. Numbers 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 22, 23, and 24 of the list in Annex A are suggested as being suitable as a group to be drawn from for this purpose.</p>	<p>German Government, in consultation with its Allies, at the time. Quadripartite agreement in principle that IZT should be used in these circumstances is being sought.</p> <p>Final decision on specific Allied countermeasures will have to be made at the time by Governments. Too much depends on the context and the exact nature of the harassment to permit advance decision. With this qualification, the countermeasures are in principle agreed by the US, France and Germany. The UK agrees these countermeasures would be appropriate if any were to be used, but reserves the decision on use of countermeasures <u>per se</u> to the time. The US, France and Germany agree that in general the countermeasures should be applied initially against the entire Soviet Bloc. The UK proposes they should be applied initially against the GDR alone unless other bloc members have associated themselves overtly in the harassment.</p>	<p>a violation of the (IZT) Agreement and the Federal Government would be in a position to institute countermeasures immediately."</p> <p>The relation of IZT to the harassment might initially be pointed out by the West German IZT office to its East German counterpart.</p> <p>The US, France and Germany hold that the GDR and the Soviet Union particularly can under no circumstances be treated separately with respect to countermeasures.</p>
2. Blockage of rail, road or barge traffic, or two or all of them.	If German traffic is so limited by measures of this sort as to reduce it below levels sufficient to main-	<p>Protest statement by German Government.</p> <p>Protest by the Three Powers at an appropriate level (pre-</p>	<p>For decision by the German Government at the time.</p> <p>For decision by the Three Governments at the time.</p>	The Working Group report submitted to the Ministers at Paris in August 1961 stated, "Should the Soviet-occupied

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
expensive, difficult and uncertain.	the transport being interfered with. (The German delegation has suggested to its Government the preparation of a paper on German traffic to be annexed to this report.)	<p>While the IZT agreement should not be involved substantially for such measures, it would be well for the link between interzonal trade and access to Berlin to be emphasized by some limited trade retaliation, commensurate in severity with the severity of harassment. (Re IZT, see Annex D)</p> <p>Selective Allied countermeasures would be applied concurrently with countermeasures under IZT. Numbers 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 22, 23, and 24 of the list in Annex A are suggested as being suitable as a group to be drawn from for this purpose.</p>	<p>German Government, in consultation with its Allies, at the time. Quadripartite agreement in principle that IZT should be used in these circumstances is being sought.</p> <p>Final decision on specific Allied countermeasures will have to be made at the time by Governments. Too much depends on the context and the exact nature of the harassment to permit advance decision. With this qualification, the countermeasures are in principle agreed by the US, France and Germany. The UK agrees these countermeasures would be appropriate if any were to be used, but reserves the decision on use of countermeasures <u>per se</u> to the time. The US, France and Germany agree that in general the countermeasures should be applied initially against the entire Soviet Bloc. The UK proposes they should be applied initially against the GDR alone unless other bloc members have associated themselves overtly in the harassment.</p>	<p>a violation of the (IZT) Agreement and the Federal Government would be in a position to institute countermeasures immediately."</p> <p>The relation of IZT to the harassment might initially be pointed out by the West German IZT office to its East German counterpart.</p> <p>The US, France and Germany hold that the GDR and the Soviet Union particularly can under no circumstances be treated separately with respect to countermeasures.</p>
2. Blockage of rail, road or barge traffic, or two or all of them.	If German traffic is so limited by measures of this sort as to reduce it below levels sufficient to main-	<p>Protest statement by German Government.</p> <p>Protest by the Three Powers at an appropriate level (pre-</p>	<p>For decision by the German Government at the time.</p> <p>For decision by the Three Governments at the time.</p>	The Working Group report submitted to the Ministers at Paris in August 1961 stated, "Should the Soviet-occupied

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

tain Berlin adequately, an Allied military airlift should be begun to take up the balance of the freight and passengers, or Allied ground traffic should be expanded to accommodate them (see below). For complete blockage, the Quadripartite Airlift (QBAL) might be instituted.

sumably the Ambassadors in Bonn initially to be followed by protests to Moscow, except in severe cases when the latter would occur at once).

Reduction of trade under the IZT commensurate with extent of the blockage, total cancellation to meet total blockage. (Re IZT see Annex D.)

Allied countermeasures should be taken commensurate with the extent of blockage. The list provided above for harassment of German access (II B 1) would be used initially. For more serious blockage, additional measures from list A would be considered. For complete blockage of German land access see Annex E.

Airlift plans are agreed, but require Government decision to put into effect.

The specific use of IZT would be for decision by the German Government, in consultation with its Allies, at the time.

Final decision on specific Allied countermeasures for less than complete blockage will have to be made at the time by Governments. Too much depends on the context and the exact nature of the blockage to permit advance decision. With this qualification, the countermeasures mentioned are in principle agreed by the US, France and Germany. The UK agrees these countermeasures would be appropriate if any were to be used, but reserves until the time the decision on use of countermeasures per se. The US, France and Germany agree that in general the countermeasures should be applied initially against the entire Soviet Bloc. The UK proposes they should be applied initially against the GDR alone unless other

Zone substantially interfere with Berlin traffic (German traffic) then this would be a violation of the (IZT) agreement and the Federal Government would be in a position to institute countermeasures immediately.

The US, France and Germany hold that the GDR and the Soviet Union particularly can under no circumstances be treated

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

tain Berlin adequately, an Allied military airlift should be begun to take up the balance of the freight and passengers, or Allied ground traffic should be expanded to accommodate them (see below). For complete blockage, the Quadripartite Airlift (QBAL) might be instituted.

sumably the Ambassadors in Bonn initially to be followed by protests to Moscow, except in severe cases when the latter would occur at once).

Reduction of trade under the IZT commensurate with extent of the blockage, total cancellation to meet total blockage. (Re IZT see Annex D.)

Allied countermeasures should be taken commensurate with the extent of blockage. The list provided above for harassment of German access (II B 1) would be used initially. For more serious blockage, additional measures from list A would be considered. For complete blockage of German land access see Annex E.

Airlift plans are agreed, but require Government decision to put into effect.

The specific use of IZT would be for decision by the German Government, in consultation with its Allies, at the time.

Final decision on specific Allied countermeasures for less than complete blockage will have to be made at the time by Governments. Too much depends on the context and the exact nature of the blockage to permit advance decision. With this qualification, the countermeasures mentioned are in principle agreed by the US, France and Germany. The UK agrees these countermeasures would be appropriate if any were to be used, but reserves until the time the decision on use of countermeasures per se. The US, France and Germany agree that in general the countermeasures should be applied initially against the entire Soviet Bloc. The UK proposes they should be applied initially against the GDR alone unless other

Zone substantially interfere with Berlin traffic (German traffic) then this would be a violation of the (IZT) agreement and the Federal Government would be in a position to institute countermeasures immediately.

The US, France and Germany hold that the GDR and the Soviet Union particularly can under no circumstances be treated

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

If blockage is total and persists, consideration will have to be given at some point to carrying German traffic on the ground, by accompanying convoys of trucks with Allied military drivers in the trucks, or in some other way which brings German transport within Allied access.

If such efforts fail, consideration will have to be given to forcing access for German traffic. However, if such action were to be related to German traffic, it would ultimately, presumably, take the form of military operations, depending on the results of other measures being taken.

members have associated themselves in the harassment.

With respect to complete blockage, the countermeasures at Annex E are under consideration by French and German Governments. UK position is set forth in the Annex. This is a US paper and is being circulated as the proposed basis for the making of decisions.

The US is undertaking a study of this possible action. Further consideration will be given quadripartitely when the study is completed.

separately with respect to countermeasures.

The UK considers, subject to consideration of the study, the taking of German traffic under Allied aegis to be impracticable and undesirable.

A decision will have to be taken at the time by Governments (of the Four Powers or NATO as appropriate) to implement military plans. Planning is underway by Governments, LIVE OAK and major NATO commands regarding the timing and nature of military action. In addition to the Free Style probe, a plan for an operation by a reinforced battalion (Trade Wind) is agreed tripartitely. Logistic

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

If blockage is total and persists, consideration will have to be given at some point to carrying German traffic on the ground, by accompanying convoys of trucks with Allied military drivers in the trucks, or in some other way which brings German transport within Allied access.

If such efforts fail, consideration will have to be given to forcing access for German traffic. However, if such action were to be related to German traffic, it would ultimately, presumably, take the form of military operations, depending on the results of other measures being taken.

members have associated themselves in the harassment.

With respect to complete blockage, the countermeasures at Annex E are under consideration by French and German Governments. UK position is set forth in the Annex. This is a US paper and is being circulated as the proposed basis for the making of decisions.

The US is undertaking a study of this possible action. Further consideration will be given quadripartitely when the study is completed.

separately with respect to countermeasures.

The UK considers, subject to consideration of the study, the taking of German traffic under Allied aegis to be impracticable and undesirable.

A decision will have to be taken at the time by Governments (of the Four Powers or NATO as appropriate) to implement military plans. Planning is underway by Governments, LIVE OAK and major NATO commands regarding the timing and nature of military action. In addition to the Free Style probe, a plan for an operation by a reinforced battalion (Trade Wind) is agreed tripartitely. Logistic

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p><u>C. Blockage of both Allied and German ground access, air access still being open.</u></p>		<p>Severe military, political, economic, and psychological countermeasures from Annex A and B would be taken, including countermeasures amount-</p>	<p>and organizational planning for a division-sized probe action (June Ball) is in preparation. The following instructions have been given to major NATO commanders by NATO members: For the purpose of providing as great a choice as possible of supplementary alternatives, NATO military plans covering broad land, air or naval measures should be prepared by the major NATO Commanders as appropriate. In each case, the expected advantages and estimated risks should be set out in specific terms to accompany plans. In particular, plans to provide for the following should be studied urgently:</p> <p>(a) Appropriate alert measures for NATO forces prior to initiation of any tripartite military measures; (b) expanded non-nuclear air and/or naval operations; (c) expanded non-nuclear ground operations with necessary air support; (d) selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them. (Approved NATO Oct. 17)</p> <p>Decisions on military, political and psychological countermeasures will be required. Economic countermeasures amounting to an</p>	<p>The Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in August 1961 agreed that economic countermeasures represent an integral part of the overall Allied policy for</p> <p>11-9-61</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p><u>C. Blockage of both Allied and German ground access, air access still being open.</u></p>		<p>Severe military, political, economic, and psychological countermeasures from Annex A and B would be taken, including countermeasures amount-</p>	<p>and organizational planning for a division-sized probe action (June Ball) is in preparation. The following instructions have been given to major NATO commanders by NATO members: For the purpose of providing as great a choice as possible of supplementary alternatives, NATO military plans covering broad land, air or naval measures should be prepared by the major NATO Commanders as appropriate. In each case, the expected advantages and estimated risks should be set out in specific terms to accompany plans. In particular, plans to provide for the following should be studied urgently:</p> <p>(a) Appropriate alert measures for NATO forces prior to initiation of any tripartite military measures; (b) expanded non-nuclear air and/or naval operations; (c) expanded non-nuclear ground operations with necessary air support; (d) selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them. (Approved NATO Oct. 17)</p> <p>Decisions on military, political and psychological countermeasures will be required. Economic countermeasures amounting to an</p>	<p>The Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in August 1961 agreed that economic countermeasures represent an integral part of the overall Allied policy for</p> <p>11-9-61</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
	<p data-bbox="708 702 1173 801">Consideration would have to be given to resorting to a quadripartite airlift (QBAL).</p> <p data-bbox="700 992 1154 1214">If blockage persists, consideration will have to be given to the timing of military operations as indicated by the results of political and other actions being taken.</p>	<p data-bbox="1189 227 1624 322">ing to a total economic embargo against the Soviet Bloc.</p> <p data-bbox="1170 827 1577 916">An approach to the UN Security Council could be made.</p>	<p data-bbox="1670 236 2132 685">economic embargo against the Soviet Bloc were agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in August 1961. The NATO Council is considering a resolution which provides along the lines that, upon determination by NATO member Governments that substantially complete blockage has occurred, they will take measures amounting to an economic embargo.</p> <p data-bbox="1659 723 2148 817">QBAL plans are agreed quadripartitely but require government decision to implement.</p> <p data-bbox="1659 839 2132 982">No definite decision has been taken in approaching the UN at this stage. It should be made at the time by Governments.</p> <p data-bbox="1651 1012 2132 1495">A decision will have to be taken at the time by Governments (of the Four Powers or NATO as appropriate) to implement military plans. Planning is underway by Governments, LIVE OAK and major NATO commands regarding the nature and timing of military action. In addition to the Free Style probe, a plan for an operation by a reinforced battalion (Trade Wind) is agreed tripartitely. Logistic and organizational planning</p>	<p data-bbox="2140 249 2650 470">meeting the threat to West Berlin. These countermeasures cannot substitute for military, political, and psychological actions, but can serve as an effective auxiliary to such actions.</p> <p data-bbox="2140 492 2650 710">The UK envisages that the most severe economic countermeasures would be taken at the moment of final crisis in connection with the most severe military, political and psychological countermeasures.</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
	<p data-bbox="708 702 1173 801">Consideration would have to be given to resorting to a quadripartite airlift (QBAL).</p> <p data-bbox="700 992 1154 1214">If blockage persists, consideration will have to be given to the timing of military operations as indicated by the results of political and other actions being taken.</p>	<p data-bbox="1184 227 1624 318">ing to a total economic embargo against the Soviet Bloc.</p> <p data-bbox="1170 827 1577 918">An approach to the UN Security Council could be made.</p>	<p data-bbox="1664 236 2113 690">economic embargo against the Soviet Bloc were agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in August 1961. The NATO Council is considering a resolution which provides along the lines that, upon determination by NATO member Governments that substantially complete blockage has occurred, they will take measures amounting to an economic embargo.</p> <p data-bbox="1659 723 2148 822">QBAL plans are agreed quadripartitely but require government decision to implement.</p> <p data-bbox="1654 839 2134 992">No definite decision has been taken in approaching the UN at this stage. It should be made at the time by Governments.</p> <p data-bbox="1645 1012 2140 1503">A decision will have to be taken at the time by Governments (of the Four Powers or NATO as appropriate) to implement military plans. Planning is underway by Governments, LIVE OAK and major NATO commands regarding the nature and timing of military action. In addition to the Free Style probe, a plan for an operation by a reinforced battalion (Trade Wind) is agreed tripartitely. Logistic and organizational planning</p>	<p data-bbox="2134 244 2642 467">meeting the threat to West Berlin. These countermeasures cannot substitute for military, political, and psychological actions, but can serve as an effective auxiliary to such actions.</p> <p data-bbox="2134 492 2642 715">The UK envisages that the most severe economic countermeasures would be taken at the moment of final crisis in connection with the most severe military, political and psychological countermeasures.</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p><u>D. Blockage of both Allied and German land access, air access closed.</u></p>	<p>If air access, politically the most vital of access routes, had been closed, the Allies would already have begun intensive efforts in the military and non-military fields to reopen it. Closing of ground access would complete the blockade of Berlin and would lead to intensification of the efforts to reopen access.</p>		<p>for a division-sized action is in preparation (June Ball). The following instructions have been given to major NATO commanders by NATO members: For the purpose of providing as great a choice as possible of supplementary alternatives, NATO military plans covering broad land, air or naval measures should be prepared by the major NATO Commanders as appropriate. In each case, the expected advantages and estimated risks should be set out in specific terms to accompany plans. In particular, plans to provide for the following should be studied urgently:</p> <p>(a) Appropriate alert measures for NATO forces prior to initiation of any tripartite military measures; (b) expanded non-nuclear air and/or naval operations; (c) expanded non-nuclear ground operations with necessary air support; (d) selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them. (Approved NATO Oct 17)</p>	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p>D. <u>Blockage of both Allied and German land access, air access closed.</u></p>	<p>If air access, politically the most vital of access routes, had been closed, the Allies would already have begun intensive efforts in the military and non-military fields to reopen it. Closing of ground access would complete the blockade of Berlin and would lead to intensification of the efforts to reopen access.</p>		<p>for a division-sized action is in preparation (June Ball). The following instructions have been given to major NATO commanders by NATO members: For the purpose of providing as great a choice as possible of supplementary alternatives, NATO military plans covering broad land, air or naval measures should be prepared by the major NATO Commanders as appropriate. In each case, the expected advantages and estimated risks should be set out in specific terms to accompany plans. In particular, plans to provide for the following should be studied urgently:</p> <p>(a) Appropriate alert measures for NATO forces prior to initiation of any tripartite military measures; (b) expanded non-nuclear air and/or naval operations; (c) expanded non-nuclear ground operations with necessary air support; (d) selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them. (Approved NATO Oct 17)</p>	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
III. HARASSMENTS WITHIN BERLIN.				
<u>A. Interference with Allied Access to East Berlin.</u>				
1. Harassment but not denial of Allied entry into East Berlin.				
a. East German police demand to see identification or other documents of uniformed personnel in an official vehicle, attempt to search the vehicle, etc.	Allied personnel should make customary demand to see Soviet officer. If this officer does not appear, first person in uniform so blocked will withdraw. Allied Commandant is authorized send in officers carrying official documents or protests to Soviet authorities in East Berlin. If these officers are stopped, they should announce they are going through anyway and make an unarmed attempt to proceed to East Berlin until prevented by force. If forcibly restricted they will withdraw.	If a Soviet officer appears and permits the vehicle to proceed, no countermeasures are called for.	This is agreed US, UK and French procedure. Germans have indicated accord.	
b. East German police demand to see identification or other documents of official Allied civilian personnel in official Allied vehicles or private vehicle with	US and France refuse to show identification. Given current policy of the GDR to require it, US and French officials make no attempt to enter East Berlin by car.	The UK agrees to show identity card or passport; British of-		

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
III. HARASSMENTS WITHIN BERLIN.				
A. <u>Interference with Allied Access to East Berlin.</u>				
1. Harassment but not denial of Allied entry into East Berlin.				
a. East German police demand to see identification or other documents of uniformed personnel in an official vehicle, attempt to search the vehicle, etc.	Allied personnel should make customary demand to see Soviet officer. If this officer does not appear, first person in uniform so blocked will withdraw. Allied Commandant is authorized send in officers carrying official documents or protests to Soviet authorities in East Berlin. If these officers are stopped, they should announce they are going through anyway and make an unarmed attempt to proceed to East Berlin until prevented by force. If forcibly restricted they will withdraw.	If a Soviet officer appears and permits the vehicle to proceed, no countermeasures are called for.	This is agreed US, UK and French procedure. Germans have indicated accord.	
b. East German police demand to see identification or other documents of official Allied civilian personnel in official Allied vehicles or private vehicle with	US and France refuse to show identification. Given current policy of the GDR to require it, US and French officials make no attempt to enter East Berlin by car.	The UK agrees to show identity card or passport; British of-		

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
USAREUR (or respective UK or French) license plates, or demand to search the vehicle, etc.	Officials continue to enter East Berlin on this basis.			
c. East German police demand to see identity documents of non-uniformed Allied officials entering East Berlin on foot or by rail.	Officials should show pass, identity card or passport, but should not agree to any stamp on these documents, any customs control, or the issuance of any special GDR pass.		US and UK follow practice described in response. French officials are authorized to show passes but not passports. The question is being considered in Bonn and Berlin with a view to harmonizing procedures.	The question of demands for identification of uniformed military is being considered quadripartitely.
d.(1) East German police halt Allied military or civilian official personnel, in official or officially licensed vehicle, within East Berlin.	The same initial procedure should be followed by these two categories of personnel as at the checkpoints. The vehicle should contact its headquarters if it has a radio.	If the vehicle is allowed to proceed under the prescribed conditions, no countermeasures are required.		
d.(2) The vehicle is not permitted to proceed, and a Soviet officer is not called.	The vehicle should proceed unless physically prevented or unless to do so would involve injury to someone. If the vehicle cannot proceed, personnel should remain in the vehicle and stay where they are, repeating demands to see a Soviet officer. When it becomes imperative for reasons of health or comfort, the personnel may comply under pretext with demands upon them.	A pretext should be made by the Commandants. If the vehicle is held until the personnel must comply, the Allied Commandants should take appropriate countermeasures, such as detaining a Soviet vehicle in West Berlin (other than BASC or Spandau personnel).	It should be assured that the Commandants have authorization to take the proposed countermeasures. (US and UK consider that the Commandant should have such authority, and discussions are taking place on the question in Berlin.)	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
USAREUR (or respective UK or French) license plates, or demand to search the vehicle, etc.	Officials continue to enter East Berlin on this basis.			
c. East German police demand to see identity documents of non-uniformed Allied officials entering East Berlin on foot or by rail.	Officials should show pass, identity card or passport, but should not agree to any stamp on these documents, any customs control, or the issuance of any special GDR pass.		US and UK follow practice described in response. French officials are authorized to show passes but not passports. The question is being considered in Bonn and Berlin with a view to harmonizing procedures.	The question of demands for identification of uniformed military is being considered quadripartitely.
d.(1) East German police halt Allied military or civilian official personnel, in official or officially licensed vehicle, within East Berlin.	The same initial procedure should be followed by these two categories of personnel as at the checkpoints. The vehicle should contact its headquarters if it has a radio.	If the vehicle is allowed to proceed under the prescribed conditions, no countermeasures are required.		
d.(2) The vehicle is not permitted to proceed, and a Soviet officer is not called.	The vehicle should proceed unless physically prevented or unless to do so would involve injury to someone. If the vehicle cannot proceed, personnel should remain in the vehicle and stay where they are, repeating demands to see a Soviet officer. When it becomes imperative for reasons of health or comfort, the personnel may comply under pretext with demands upon them.	A pretext should be made by the Commandants. If the vehicle is held until the personnel must comply, the Allied Commandants should take appropriate countermeasures, such as detaining a Soviet vehicle in West Berlin (other than BASC or Spandau personnel).	It should be assured that the Commandants have authorization to take the proposed countermeasures. (US and UK consider that the Commandant should have such authority, and discussions are taking place on the question in Berlin.)	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments	
d.(3) The East German police demand that the vehicle accompany them to a police station, etc.	The Allied personnel should refuse, and follow the same procedure as in d(2) above. In this event, however, acceding to demands will mean ultimately going to an East German office with the police. If this occurs, the personnel should refuse to deal with the East Germans and demand to be put in touch with Soviet officials and to contact their own headquarters. In extricating them, Allied headquarters should deal only with the Soviets.	Arrest of Allied personnel by East Germans is more serious than unacceptable controls on their passage. A stronger protest should be made, and a Soviet vehicle (but not BASC or Spandau) should be detained until release is secured. If serious harassment of this sort continues, the question will arise whether to take more far-reaching countermeasures. An initial step might be denying entry to all War Memorial guards and arresting those currently in West Berlin.	It should be assured that the Commandants have authorization to take the proposed countermeasures. (US and UK consider that the Commandants should have such authority, and discussions are taking place on the question in Berlin.)		
2. Denial of Allied Access to East Berlin.	a. All Allied military or official civilian personnel are prevented from passing the crossing point (by unacceptable GDR demands or by other means) or the crossing point is formally closed.	Allied personnel should make customary demand to see Soviet officer. If this denied or if officer does not appear, first person in uniform so blocked will withdraw. Allied Commandant is authorized send in officers carrying official documents or protests to Soviet authorities in East Berlin. If these officers are stopped, they should announce they are going through anyway and make an unarmed attempt to proceed to East Berlin until pre-	(i) Protests to Karlshorst. (ii) Controls on CD and CC vehicles from East Berlin. This would build up to control of Soviet vehicles. (iii) Action against Soviet personnel. (a) Soviet civilian and official personnel. Ostentatious escort. Minor delays on movement. Retention for a limited period of time.	Response agreed to quadripartitely. Details being coordinated in Berlin. Countermeasures inside Berlin have been agreed among the Commandants in Berlin. The UK and France have agreed in principle but wished to study further. US and Germany agree they should be taken. Quadripartite agreement being sought.	Responses agreed in connection with GDR demand for identity document of uniformed military personnel. This is most likely form in which situation would arise but general applicability being considered quadripartitely.

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments	
d.(3) The East German police demand that the vehicle accompany them to a police station, etc.	The Allied personnel should refuse, and follow the same procedure as in d(2) above. In this event, however, acceding to demands will mean ultimately going to an East German office with the police. If this occurs, the personnel should refuse to deal with the East Germans and demand to be put in touch with Soviet officials and to contact their own headquarters. In extricating them, Allied headquarters should deal only with the Soviets.	Arrest of Allied personnel by East Germans is more serious than unacceptable controls on their passage. A stronger protest should be made, and a Soviet vehicle (but not BASC or Spandau) should be detained until release is secured. If serious harassment of this sort continues, the question will arise whether to take more far-reaching countermeasures. An initial step might be denying entry to all War Memorial guards and arresting those currently in West Berlin.	It should be assured that the Commandants have authorization to take the proposed countermeasures. (US and UK consider that the Commandants should have such authority, and discussions are taking place on the question in Berlin.)		
2. Denial of Allied Access to East Berlin.	a. All Allied military or official civilian personnel are prevented from passing the crossing point (by unacceptable GDR demands or by other means) or the crossing point is formally closed.	Allied personnel should make customary demand to see Soviet officer. If this denied or if officer does not appear, first person in uniform so blocked will withdraw. Allied Commandant is authorized send in officers carrying official documents or protests to Soviet authorities in East Berlin. If these officers are stopped, they should announce they are going through anyway and make an unarmed attempt to proceed to East Berlin until pre-	(i) Protests to Karlshorst. (ii) Controls on CD and CC vehicles from East Berlin. This would build up to control of Soviet vehicles. (iii) Action against Soviet personnel. (a) Soviet civilian and official personnel. Ostentatious escort. Minor delays on movement. Retention for a limited period of time.	Response agreed to quadripartitely. Details being coordinated in Berlin. Countermeasures inside Berlin have been agreed among the Commandants in Berlin. The UK and France have agreed in principle but wished to study further. US and Germany agree they should be taken. Quadripartite agreement being sought.	Responses agreed in connection with GDR demand for identity document of uniformed military personnel. This is most likely form in which situation would arise but general applicability being considered quadripartitely.

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

vented by force. If forcibly restricted they will withdraw. (US instructions provide that a vehicle is "blocked" in this sense if it cannot proceed without injuring someone or without removing obstacles with bulldozers, tanks or demolition.)

Countermeasures

Temporary refusal to admit to West Berlin.
Expulsion.
(b) Soviet military vehicles, including War Memorial Guard.
As for (a) above
Note: These measures would not effect BASC and Spandau personnel.
(iv) Harassment of Czech and Polish Missions.
(a) Withdrawal of logistic privileges.
(b) Residence force, or
(c) Expulsion.

Status of Decision

Comments

Tripartite protest in Moscow. Quadripartitely agreed.

If approach in Moscow fails, countermeasures should be taken outside the context of circulation within Berlin: Annex A, numbers 6, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15 (selective).

(The question of a complete TFD ban at this stage is being discussed in Bonn.)

US, France and Germany agree, though France wished further study. UK considers the measures might be right in these circumstances but reserves a final decision until the time. Further quadripartite study being undertaken urgently.

Countermeasures outside the context of circulation in Berlin would seem justified in this case even though they would be unlikely to effect opening of the boundary. They would be needed to show our will and ability to react to Soviet encroachment generally. They should be of such a nature that they could be maintained throughout the crisis.

B. Interference with West German and West Berliner access to East Berlin.

1. Further restriction on but not denial of entry of West Germans or West

If the restriction is severe and affects West Germans, the latter should point out to the East Germans

A decision should be taken whether to involve IZT at all in the question of circulation within Berlin. It was

Action by the East Germans to bar West Germans and West Berliners from East Berlin cannot be affected materially

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

vented by force. If forcibly restricted they will withdraw. (US instructions provide that a vehicle is "blocked" in this sense if it cannot proceed without injuring someone or without removing obstacles with bulldozers, tanks or demolition.)

Countermeasures

Temporary refusal to admit to West Berlin.
Expulsion.
(b) Soviet military vehicles, including War Memorial Guard.
As for (a) above
Note: These measures would not effect BASC and Spandau personnel.
(iv) Harassment of Czech and Polish Missions.
(a) Withdrawal of logistic privileges.
(b) Residence force, or
(c) Expulsion.

Status of Decision

Comments

Tripartite protest in Moscow. Quadripartitely agreed.

If approach in Moscow fails, countermeasures should be taken outside the context of circulation within Berlin: Annex A, numbers 6, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15 (selective).

(The question of a complete TFD ban at this stage is being discussed in Bonn.)

US, France and Germany agree, though France wished further study. UK considers the measures might be right in these circumstances but reserves a final decision until the time. Further quadripartite study being undertaken urgently.

Countermeasures outside the context of circulation in Berlin would seem justified in this case even though they would be unlikely to effect opening of the boundary. They would be needed to show our will and ability to react to Soviet encroachment generally. They should be of such a nature that they could be maintained throughout the crisis.

B. Interference with West German and West Berliner access to East Berlin.

1. Further restriction on but not denial of entry of West Germans or West

If the restriction is severe and affects West Germans, the latter should point out to the East Germans

A decision should be taken whether to involve IZT at all in the question of circulation within Berlin. It was

Action by the East Germans to bar West Germans and West Berliners from East Berlin cannot be affected materially

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
Berliners into East Berlin.	<p>through the usual IZT channel that inter-zonal trade is related to movement within Berlin. Perhaps steps could be taken within the terms of the IZT agreement to require payment of outstanding credits in certain categories before further shipments can be made. (Re IZT see Annex D)</p> <p>(Possible use of selective restriction of issuance of TTDs in the trade category is being considered in Bonn).</p>	<p>the opinion of the Foreign Ministers in Paris that IZT should not be used extensively except when German civilian traffic to Berlin was interfered with.</p>	<p>by any feasible Western countermeasures. The effort of the West should thus be to make clear that it regards such action as part of the general campaign against West Berlin and that it will respond with more vigorous retaliation if further steps are taken in that campaign. It would thus be well to establish the link with IZT even in the absence of intent to use it significantly in these circumstances.</p>	
<p>2.a. Denial of entry of West Germans and West Berliners to East Berlin</p>		<p>The German Government should issue a protest statement.</p> <p>The Commandants should protest at once.</p>	<p>A decision on taking measures in the context of the IZT has not been made. The two forms of protest have not been specifically decided upon.</p>	
<p>2.b. Demand by GDR that West Germans and/or West Berliners obtain East German visas for entry into East Berlin.</p>	<p>Refuse to comply.</p>	<p>Same as above, plus possible NATO countermeasures (as in denial of Allied access). In addition, a higher level protest should be considered.</p>	<p>No decision on the countermeasures has been taken.</p>	<p>It is considered that such a GDR request for de jure recognition is more serious than closing the boundary alone.</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
Berliners into East Berlin.	<p>through the usual IZT channel that inter-zonal trade is related to movement within Berlin. Perhaps steps could be taken within the terms of the IZT agreement to require payment of outstanding credits in certain categories before further shipments can be made. (Re IZT see Annex D)</p> <p>(Possible use of selective restriction of issuance of TTDs in the trade category is being considered in Bonn).</p>	<p>the opinion of the Foreign Ministers in Paris that IZT should not be used extensively except when German civilian traffic to Berlin was interfered with.</p>	<p>by any feasible Western countermeasures. The effort of the West should thus be to make clear that it regards such action as part of the general campaign against West Berlin and that it will respond with more vigorous retaliation if further steps are taken in that campaign. It would thus be well to establish the link with IZT even in the absence of intent to use it significantly in these circumstances.</p>	
<p>2.a. Denial of entry of West Germans and West Berliners to East Berlin</p>		<p>The German Government should issue a protest statement.</p> <p>The Commandants should protest at once.</p>	<p>A decision on taking measures in the context of the IZT has not been made. The two forms of protest have not been specifically decided upon.</p>	
<p>2.b. Demand by GDR that West Germans and/or West Berliners obtain East German visas for entry into East Berlin.</p>	<p>Refuse to comply.</p>	<p>Same as above, plus possible NATO countermeasures (as in denial of Allied access). In addition, a higher level protest should be considered.</p>	<p>No decision on the countermeasures has been taken.</p>	<p>It is considered that such a GDR request for de jure recognition is more serious than closing the boundary alone.</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decisions	Comments
<u>C. Harassment of or attack upon West Berlin.</u>				
1. East German psychological, economic or political harassment of West Berlin.				
1.a. Psychological harassment and disturbances:				
Increase in psychological "warfare" against West Berlin especially in critical periods of political tension by means of TV, radio, rumors, subversion.	This might be dealt with over the long run by a committee set up in Washington or Berlin to keep this problem under consideration together with the general question of Berlin <i>raison d'etre</i> and morale.		No decision has been made on such a committee.	West Berlin and West German authorities note that this psychological "warfare" has been increased considerably after August 13 - especially in the field of radio and television propaganda and with regard to rumors.
1.b. Economic harassment and disturbances within Berlin:				
1. Supply of food Halting of Soviet zone deliveries of sugar, pork and potatoes under IZT.	Substitution by supplies from Federal Republic at any given moment, as long as access open.	Protest Selective harassment in the field of IZT. (Re IZT see Annex D)	No decision has been made on the countermeasures. The response presumably requires no specific advance decision.	See Annex ____ for information on the effect of such harassment on the problem of providing supplies via access routes to West Berlin. With respect to countermeasures, their employment will be affected by the degree to which harassments are cumulative and result therefore in a more serious situation than sporadic or isolated harassment would create.
2. Supply of other goods Soft coal and construction material	Soft coal could not easily be replaced by West German	See III. 1.b.		There are strategic stores for raw material and products for

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decisions	Comments
<u>C. Harassment of or attack upon West Berlin.</u>				
1. East German psychological, economic or political harassment of West Berlin.				
1.a. Psychological harassment and disturbances:				
Increase in psychological "warfare" against West Berlin especially in critical periods of political tension by means of TV, radio, rumors, subversion.	This might be dealt with over the long run by a committee set up in Washington or Berlin to keep this problem under consideration together with the general question of Berlin <i>raison d'etre</i> and morale.		No decision has been made on such a committee.	West Berlin and West German authorities note that this psychological "warfare" has been increased considerably after August 13 - especially in the field of radio and television propaganda and with regard to rumors.
1.b. Economic harassment and disturbances within Berlin:				
1. Supply of food Halting of Soviet zone deliveries of sugar, pork and potatoes under IZT.	Substitution by supplies from Federal Republic at any given moment, as long as access open.	Protest Selective harassment in the field of IZT. (Re IZT see Annex D)	No decision has been made on the countermeasures. The response presumably requires no specific advance decision.	See Annex _____ for information on the effect of such harassment on the problem of providing supplies via access routes to West Berlin. With respect to countermeasures, their employment will be affected by the degree to which harassments are cumulative and result therefore in a more serious situation than sporadic or isolated harassment would create.
2. Supply of other goods Soft coal and construction material.	Soft coal could not easily be replaced by West German	See III. 1.b.		There are strategic stores for raw material and products for

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
gasoline (Diesel)	deliveries.			<p>higher consumption for approximately 9 months (coal one year).</p> <p>West Berlin has almost no raw materials of its own and thus is almost fully dependent on deliveries from other sources (East Germany and Federal Republic).</p> <p>See Annex ____.</p>
<p>3. Railroad and locks operation</p> <p>Soviet zone and East Berlin supply services in connection with railroad operations in Berlin and with regard to locks in Berlin (Rothensee). Railroad as well as locks are operated by East German administration. Disturbances with West Berlin barges are conceivably notably at the locks.</p>	<p>Transfer to road traffic insofar as possible would become necessary.</p>	<p>West Berlin would be in a position to flood zone areas or East Berlin areas in case of seizure of the locks by West Berlin.</p> <p>Also it is to be noted that countermeasures against East German and Soviet Bloc barges on the West German canal and water system are conceivable and remain to be studied. Also see III. 1.b.</p> <p>Additional non-military countermeasures should be envisaged.</p>	<p>Such countermeasures as flooding of certain areas will have to be studied in Berlin.</p> <p>No decision has been made regarding countermeasures under these circumstances.</p> <p>The possibility of diverting trains to East Berlin should be studied in Bonn and Berlin.</p>	<p>The Soviet zone is in a position to terminate railroad operation in West Berlin without serious disturbances of its own railroad system (a complete railroad system around the city is available to the zone authorities). Soviet zone barge operation across the sector boundary has been terminated on August 13.</p> <p>It is possible to direct all Western supply trains to East Berlin railroad station and thus harass considerably free deliveries to West Berlin. Allied train traffic could conceivably be affected in this way.</p> <p>As a spontaneous public reaction the number of S-Bahn users in West has decreased from a daily rate of 500,000 to 100,000 since August 13 (estimate).</p>
<p>4. S-Bahn operation in West Berlin. (termination)</p>	<p>West Berlin authorized extend bus services.</p>	<p>See III. 1.b.</p>	<p>Readiness to make response should be assured in Berlin.</p>	<p>As a spontaneous public reaction the number of S-Bahn users in West has decreased from a daily rate of 500,000 to 100,000 since August 13 (estimate).</p>
<p>5. Supply of gas; electric power and water. There is a gas pipe-</p>	<p>West Berlin gas suppliers</p>			<p>There is no longer any supply of these services from East Berlin or Soviet zone.</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
gasoline (Diesel)	deliveries.			<p>higher consumption for approximately 9 months (coal one year).</p> <p>West Berlin has almost no raw materials of its own and thus is almost fully dependent on deliveries from other sources (East Germany and Federal Republic).</p> <p>See Annex ____.</p>
<p>3. Railroad and locks operation</p> <p>Soviet zone and East Berlin supply services in connection with railroad operations in Berlin and with regard to locks in Berlin (Rothensee). Railroad as well as locks are operated by East German administration. Disturbances with West Berlin barges are conceivably notably at the locks.</p>	<p>Transfer to road traffic insofar as possible would become necessary.</p>	<p>West Berlin would be in a position to flood zone areas or East Berlin areas in case of seizure of the locks by West Berlin.</p> <p>Also it is to be noted that countermeasures against East German and Soviet Bloc barges on the West German canal and water system are conceivable and remain to be studied. Also see III. 1.b.</p> <p>Additional non-military countermeasures should be envisaged.</p>	<p>Such countermeasures as flooding of certain areas will have to be studied in Berlin.</p> <p>No decision has been made regarding countermeasures under these circumstances.</p> <p>The possibility of diverting trains to East Berlin should be studied in Bonn and Berlin.</p>	<p>The Soviet zone is in a position to terminate railroad operation in West Berlin without serious disturbances of its own railroad system (a complete railroad system around the city is available to the zone authorities). Soviet zone barge operation across the sector boundary has been terminated on August 13.</p> <p>It is possible to direct all Western supply trains to East Berlin railroad station and thus harass considerably free deliveries to West Berlin. Allied train traffic could conceivably be affected in this way.</p> <p>As a spontaneous public reaction the number of S-Bahn users in West has decreased from a daily rate of 500,000 to 100,000 since August 13 (estimate).</p>
<p>4. S-Bahn operation in West Berlin. (termination)</p>	<p>West Berlin authorized extend bus services.</p>	<p>See III. 1.b.</p>	<p>Readiness to make response should be assured in Berlin.</p>	<p>As a spontaneous public reaction the number of S-Bahn users in West has decreased from a daily rate of 500,000 to 100,000 since August 13 (estimate).</p>
<p>5. Supply of gas; electric power and water. There is a gas pipe-</p>	<p>West Berlin gas suppliers</p>			<p>There is no longer any supply of these services from East Berlin or Soviet zone.</p>

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
line from Salzgitter/West Germany to Borsig-factory in West Berlin which could be cut off easily.	could substitute easily.			
6. Sewage				
It is to be noted that in the field of sewage there is joint West- and East Berlin system. Separation of this joint system is unlikely.	Nevertheless precautionary measures have been taken (5,000 tons chlorine are stocked in Berlin) in order to assure proper sewage.			
7. Disturbances				
of telecommunication and radio systems between West Berlin and the Federal Republic or other Western countries.	Reduce communications to most important traffic as necessary.	See III, 1.b.	No decisions have been taken on responses or countermeasures.	US experts consider that, with utilization of the techniques referred to, Berlin cannot be blacked out without unacceptable interference with Soviet/GDR transmissions.
	Utilize limited ECCM to maintain communications disregarding assigned frequencies.	It is to be noted that the East German radio-TV system which is equipped by Siemens depends on regular supplies of essential operational parts from West Berlin. This is a field where retaliation or countermeasures could be applied under certain circumstances.		
	Station VHF/UHG relay aircraft in the corridor.	Stop payment of due costs to East German System through West German Bundespost.		German experts point out that the wireless communication system between West Berlin and the Federal Republic does not depend on relay stations in the Soviet zone; however, jamming is possible. The cable communication system between West Berlin and the Federal Republic could be cut off, however, the cables are also used for Soviet Bloc communications to the West.

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
1.c. Maintenance of blockage for workers and employees from East Berlin and Soviet zone to work in West Berlin.	West Berlin attempts to fill the gap by activation of labor reserves, by rationing production processes, and by attracting additional labor from West Germany.	Further studies necessary. Demand for free circulation within Berlin should be repeated constantly.	The problem is being dealt with by the West Berlin administration.	
1.d. Political disturbances: Attempts to cut existing political legislative and administrative links with the Federal Republic.	Rejection of Soviet demands and assertion that existing links between FRG and West Berlin are in accordance with Four Power Status of Berlin The Western responses and countermeasures will largely depend on the methods the Soviet Union will apply to erode this element of the viability of West Berlin, i.e. whether they act:		This question is being considered in the context of the various programs indicated.	With reference to d.5. it should be noted that at present there are approximately 80 Federal German Boards and offices or agencies working in Berlin. They employ 18,000 officials and employees.
1) identity of political, legal and social-economic systems of West Berlin and Federal Republic	1.) through psychological warfare (responses and countermeasures - See III.1)			
2) constitutional links; representation of West Berlin in Bundestag and Bundesrat and other forms of participation in the constitutional life of the Federal Republic	2.) through political pressure (responses and countermeasures - See Paris and Washington Working Group reports) 3.) through air-access harassment (responses and countermeasures - see I A-D) 4.) through negotiations responses and countermeasures - see Paris and Washington Working Group reports)			
3) adoption of Federal laws	The German delegation intends to submit additional proposals in due course.			The re-transfer of these Federal German Boards and agencies from Berlin to the Federal Republic would cause immense political and psychological problems.
4) foreign representation by the Federal Republic				
5) Federal authorities in Berlin				
6) meetings of Federal constitutional				

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
1.c. Maintenance of blockage for workers and employees from East Berlin and Soviet zone to work in West Berlin.	West Berlin attempts to fill the gap by activation of labor reserves, by rationing production processes, and by attracting additional labor from West Germany.	Further studies necessary. Demand for free circulation within Berlin should be repeated constantly.	The problem is being dealt with by the West Berlin administration.	
1.d. Political disturbances: Attempts to cut existing political legislative and administrative links with the Federal Republic.	Rejection of Soviet demands and assertion that existing links between FRG and West Berlin are in accordance with Four Power Status of Berlin The Western responses and countermeasures will largely depend on the methods the Soviet Union will apply to erode this element of the viability of West Berlin, i.e. whether they act:	1.) through psychological warfare (responses and countermeasures - See III.1) 2.) through political pressure (responses and countermeasures - See Paris and Washington Working Group reports) 3.) through air-access harassment (responses and countermeasures - see I A-D) 4.) through negotiations responses and countermeasures - see Paris and Washington Working Group reports)	This question is being considered in the context of the various programs indicated.	With reference to d.5. it should be noted that at present there are approximately 80 Federal German Boards and offices or agencies working in Berlin. They employ 18,000 officials and employees.
1) identity of political, legal and social-economic systems of West Berlin and Federal Republic				The re-transfer of these Federal German Boards and agencies from Berlin to the Federal Republic would cause immense political and psychological problems.
2) constitutional links; representation of West Berlin in Bundestag and Bundesrat and other forms of participation in the constitutional life of the Federal Republic	The German delegation intends to submit additional proposals in due course.			
3) adoption of Federal laws				
4) foreign representation by the Federal Republic				
5) Federal authorities in Berlin				
6) meetings of Federal constitutional				

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
organs in Berlin				
7) free circulation of West Berliners in the Federal Republic and full participation in political life and public services and vice versa	8) application of Federal German system for passports and identification.			
1.e. Other disturbances				
1) Harassment of West Berlin radio and TV stations.		Countermeasures in kind (see III 1.b7) further studies advisable.		
2) Maintenance of blockage for students from East Germany and Soviet zone to follow courses in West Berlin.	There are increased endeavors to have an increased number of West German students in Berlin.	Countermeasures in the field of cultural relations should be studied inasmuch as such contacts are not yet interrupted. Interference with contacts which are desirable from the point of view of the Federal Republic of Germany should be carefully avoided.		
3) Usage of S-Bahn and railroad installations for provocative and subversive action from East Berlin.	Increased vigilance of Allied and West Berlin authorities.			
It is possible to channel through the S-Bahn a great number of communists - or even				

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
organs in Berlin				
7) free circulation of West Berliners in the Federal Republic and full participation in political life and public services and vice versa	8) application of Federal German system for passports and identification.			
1.e. Other disturbances				
1) Harassment of West Berlin radio and TV stations.		Countermeasures in kind (see III 1.b7) further studies advisable.		
2) Maintenance of blockage for students from East Germany and Soviet zone to follow courses in West Berlin.	There are increased endeavors to have an increased number of West German students in Berlin.	Countermeasures in the field of cultural relations should be studied inasmuch as such contacts are not yet interrupted. Interference with contacts which are desirable from the point of view of the Federal Republic of Germany should be carefully avoided.		
3) Usage of S-Bahn and railroad installations for provocative and subversive action from East Berlin.	Increased vigilance of Allied and West Berlin authorities.			
It is possible to channel through the S-Bahn a great number of communists - or even				

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
members of "Betrieb-skampfgruppen" or armed forces into West Berlin. (Other forceful action see III C2)	4) Provocation by organizing sabotage acts against S-Bahn installations.	See previous item		
5) Installation of Soviet zone offices and agencies in West Berlin.	This has already been attempted. Immediate closure of such agencies has been ordered and should be done in future.			
6) Provocation or incidents on the Sector boundary or the zonal border on West Berlin. (Other action of this nature see III 1)	Allied military forces at the sector boundaries use firearms only in self-defense or while under fire from East Berlin, and respond with tear gas to attack with water, stones, etc.	Serious incidents or persistent provocation should be protested by the Commandants or the particular Commandant whose sector is involved.	The responses have been discussed by Allied Missions in Berlin. Further discussions should be held there to coordinate "rules of engagement." Those described here are suggested as bases for such discussions. Protests of the nature mentioned under countermeasures are being made as required by the situation.	Response is firm U.S. policy.
7) Stein-stuecken; interruption of communication and access to Steinstuecken	Transport residents and supplies to and from Steinstuecken by U.S. Army helicopters.	Protest and warning to Soviet Commandant and/or Soviet Ambassador.		Protest authority delegated to Berlin commandants by US and UK.
2. East German/Soviet move to seize West Berlin by force, or harassment by military means.				

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
members of "Betrieb-skampfgruppen" or armed forces into West Berlin. (Other forceful action see III C2)	4) Provocation See previous item by organizing sabotage acts against S-Bahn installations.	This has already been attempted. Immediate closure of such agencies has been ordered and should be done in future.	The responses have been discussed by Allied Missions in Berlin. Further discussions should be held there to coordinate "rules of engagement." Those described here are suggested as bases for such discussions. Protests of the nature mentioned under countermeasures are being made as required by the situation.	
6) Provocation or incidents on the Sector boundary or the zonal border on West Berlin. (Other action of this nature see III 1)	Allied military forces at the sector boundaries use firearms only in self-defense or while under fire from East Berlin, and respond with tear gas to attack with water, stones, etc.	Serious incidents or persistent provocation should be protested by the Commandants or the particular Commandant whose sector is involved.	The responses have been discussed by Allied Missions in Berlin. Further discussions should be held there to coordinate "rules of engagement." Those described here are suggested as bases for such discussions. Protests of the nature mentioned under countermeasures are being made as required by the situation.	
7) Stein-stuecken; interruption of communication and access to Steinstuecken	Transport residents and supplies to and from Steinstuecken by U.S. Army helicopters. Conduct MP patrol into Steinstuecken by vehicle or helicopter.	Protest and warning to Soviet Commandant and/or Soviet Ambassador.	Response is firm U.S. policy.	Protest authority delegated to Berlin commandants by US and UK.
2. East German/Soviet move to seize West Berlin by force, or harassment by military means.				

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
2.a. Harassment by shelling, ect., not associated with direct attempt to seize the city.	Planning not yet undertaken.			Such action might occur as part of an effort to prevent use of West Berlin air fields.
2.b. Overt attack by uniformed force.	North Atlantic Treaty provisions take effect.	NATO conducts appropriate military operations.	Articles 5 and 6 of the NATO Treaty provide for collective self-defense in the event of attack upon the territory of any of the Parties in Europe.	Planning for NATO operations being done by Gen. Norstad.
	Berlin defense plan comes into effect.	Severe military and non-military countermeasures (Annex B).	See below.	
2.c. Covertly directed effort to infiltrate large numbers of activists, create widespread disorder, and seize control	West Berlin police, including Force B, seek to suppress; Allied garrisons committed if necessary. Single Allied Commander for Allied forces in Berlin.		Three governments have agreed that Gen. Norstad can designate a single commander for Berlin in the event of a grave civil disturbance, on the joint recommendation of the three Commandants, if time does not permit reference to Governments.	
		Reinforce Berlin garrisons from Allied forces in FRG.	No common decision has been taken on reinforcement of Berlin. Gen. Norstad should be asked for recommendations.	Police and existing garrisons can deal with several scores of thousands of rioters. Little additional reinforcements should be needed, if any, to handle any conceivable civil disorder.
		Bring NATO forces to state of Reinforced Alert.		
		Take additional countermeasures beyond Central Europe (See Annex B).		

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
2.a. Harassment by shelling, ect., not associated with direct attempt to seize the city.	Planning not yet undertaken.			Such action might occur as part of an effort to prevent use of West Berlin air fields.
2.b. Overt attack by uniformed force.	North Atlantic Treaty provisions take effect.	NATO conducts appropriate military operations.	Articles 5 and 6 of the NATO Treaty provide for collective self-defense in the event of attack upon the territory of any of the Parties in Europe.	Planning for NATO operations being done by Gen. Norstad.
	Berlin defense plan comes into effect.	Severe military and non-military countermeasures (Annex B).	See below.	
2.c. Covertly directed effort to infiltrate large numbers of activists, create widespread disorder, and seize control	West Berlin police, including Force B, seek to suppress; Allied garrisons committed if necessary. Single Allied Commander for Allied forces in Berlin.		Three governments have agreed that Gen. Norstad can designate a single commander for Berlin in the event of a grave civil disturbance, on the joint recommendation of the three Commandants, if time does not permit reference to Governments.	
		Reinforce Berlin garrisons from Allied forces in FRG.	No common decision has been taken on reinforcement of Berlin. Gen. Norstad should be asked for recommendations.	Police and existing garrisons can deal with several scores of thousands of rioters. Little additional reinforcements should be needed, if any, to handle any conceivable civil disorder.
		Bring NATO forces to state of Reinforced Alert.		
		Take additional countermeasures beyond Central Europe (See Annex B).		

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
IV. SOVIET POLITICAL MOVES				
A. <u>Announcement of a "peace conference"</u>	Notes to Soviets from US, UK, France and Federal Republic sent and published.	Representation to governments of all states invited to the conference to decline, as well as provision of guidance to the press.	Agreed by Four-Power Working Group and referred to governments.	Drafts of notes, material for press guidance and representations, and primary responsibility for representations contained in Report of February 10, 1961.
B. <u>Signature of a "peace treaty"</u>	Solemn statement by US, UK, France and Federal Republic.	If it seems that Soviet withdrawal from functions re Allied access to Berlin is imminent, Soviets would presumably be given contemplated note re access, and public statement would be published.	Same as above for response. The countermeasure has been approved quadripartitely, but the French have proposed a modification in the text of the note and statement which is being considered quadripartitely.	Draft of solemn statement contained in Report of February 10, 1961.
C. <u>Turnover of access control to the GDR.</u>	Instruction for Allied official vehicles and trains in this contingency came into effect. (BQD-4). This calls for Allied personnel to permit GDR checkpoint officials to receive and stamp their identity documents and movement orders, as the Soviet personnel now do. It also provides instruction for the event a greater degree of control is insisted upon by the GDR. An interim procedure is provided in BQD-4 for the event GDR personnel appear at the checkpoint without sufficient warning to permit prior issuance of the planned statement and note. In this case travelers will	Note to Soviets and issuance of public statement. (BQD 5 and 6)	The response and the countermeasure have been approved quadripartitely, but the French have proposed a modification in the text of the note and statement (countermeasure) which is being considered quadripartitely.	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
IV. SOVIET POLITICAL MOVES				
A. <u>Announcement of a "peace conference"</u>	Notes to Soviets from US, UK, France and Federal Republic sent and published.	Representation to governments of all states invited to the conference to decline, as well as provision of guidance to the press.	Agreed by Four-Power Working Group and referred to governments.	Drafts of notes, material for press guidance and representations, and primary responsibility for representations contained in Report of February 10, 1961.
B. <u>Signature of a "peace treaty"</u>	Solemn statement by US, UK, France and Federal Republic.	If it seems that Soviet withdrawal from functions re Allied access to Berlin is imminent, Soviets would presumably be given contemplated note re access, and public statement would be published.	Same as above for response. The countermeasure has been approved quadripartitely, but the French have proposed a modification in the text of the note and statement which is being considered quadripartitely.	Draft of solemn statement contained in Report of February 10, 1961.
C. <u>Turnover of access control to the GDR.</u>	Instruction for Allied official vehicles and trains in this contingency came into effect. (BQD-4). This calls for Allied personnel to permit GDR checkpoint officials to receive and stamp their identity documents and movement orders, as the Soviet personnel now do. It also provides instruction for the event a greater degree of control is insisted upon by the GDR. An interim procedure is provided in BQD-4 for the event GDR personnel appear at the checkpoint without sufficient warning to permit prior issuance of the planned statement and note. In this case travelers will	Note to Soviets and issuance of public statement. (BQD 5 and 6)	The response and the countermeasure have been approved quadripartitely, but the French have proposed a modification in the text of the note and statement (countermeasure) which is being considered quadripartitely.	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
	<p>report back to the Allied checkpoint, the personnel of which will investigate the situation and report to Allied authorities in Berlin who will inform the Embassies in Bonn. Traffic will meanwhile continue so long as the GDR makes no change in the procedure. The Embassies will consult quadripartitely and, if the checkpoint change is clearly a deliberate policy and if previous procedures are being carried out they will issue a statement and confirm that traffic should continue.</p>			

Developments in the
Crisis

Responses

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

report back to the Allied checkpoint, the personnel of which will investigate the situation and report to Allied authorities in Berlin who will inform the Embassies in Bonn. Traffic will meanwhile continue so long as the GDR makes no change in the procedure. The Embassies will consult quadripartitely and, if the checkpoint change is clearly a deliberate policy and if previous procedures are being carried out they will issue a statement and confirm that traffic should continue.

Minor Countermeasures

Economic

1. The closure of Soviet Bloc trade missions, including Amtorg offices, in NATO countries.
2. The refusal by NATO countries to enter into new contracts to charter shipping to Soviet Bloc Countries and suspend existing contracts.
3. The expansion of export control measures by NATO countries against the Soviet Bloc, including selective embargo. (Could be a major action depending on extent of control.)
4. The cut-off by NATO countries of selected types of industrial and technical exchanges in which Soviets are most interested and ban export of published and unpublished technical and scientific information.
5. The slowdown by NATO countries in issuance of export licenses and foreign exchange licensing for shipments to Soviet Bloc.
6. The cancellation by NATO countries of arrangements for Soviet Bloc participation in exhibitions, trade fairs, scientific conferences, and other international meetings.
7. The warning to NATO shipping and civil aircraft to avoid using Soviet Bloc harbors and airports.
8. The closure of NATO country frontiers to Soviet Bloc officials engaging in trade or commerce.
9. The cancellation of arrangements for NATO country participation in exhibitions, trade fairs, scientific conferences, and other international meetings scheduled in Soviet Bloc countries.
10. Preparation and implementation by NATO countries of countermeasures against USSR and "GDR" in form of controls over transport on basis equivalent to any Soviet or GDR harassments.
11. Restrain movement of personnel of Soviet trade missions, including Amtorg, in NATO countries.

Other Non-military

12. Tighten controls over Soviet Bloc personnel at frontiers, ports, and airports of NATO countries as evidence of increased caution.
13. Refuse TTID's to Soviet Zone travelers either on complete or selective basis.
14. Restrict circulation of Soviet Bloc officials and visitors over metropolitan territories of NATO countries.
15. Prohibit tourist travel of Soviet Bloc nationals in NATO countries.
16. Suspend or cancel cultural exchange agreements between Bloc and NATO countries.
17. In light of reactions to earlier stages, consider requesting neutral countries to make representations to USSR for removal of obstructions to Berlin access.

*Military

18. Continue air surveillance along Greenland, Iceland and UK line.
19. Execute anti-submarine surveillance at Straits of Gibraltar and in the Aegean Sea with visible patrolling.
20. Increase air activities (surveillance, military presence, etc.) along Soviet Bloc borders/radar barrier, utilizing resources of Far East Allies to the extent possible.
21. Assemble key tripartite/NATO commanders at Paris for readiness conference.

*Military measures list is tentative. More complete and refined lists are being prepared by the four governments. Maritime control measures are being studied quadripartitely.

Minor Countermeasures

Economic

1. The closure of Soviet Bloc trade missions, including Amtorg offices, in NATO countries.
2. The refusal by NATO countries to enter into new contracts to charter shipping to Soviet Bloc Countries and suspend existing contracts.
3. The expansion of export control measures by NATO countries against the Soviet Bloc, including selective embargo. (Could be a major action depending on extent of control.)
4. The cut-off by NATO countries of selected types of industrial and technical exchanges in which Soviets are most interested and ban export of published and unpublished technical and scientific information.
5. The slowdown by NATO countries in issuance of export licenses and foreign exchange licensing for shipments to Soviet Bloc.
6. The cancellation by NATO countries of arrangements for Soviet Bloc participation in exhibitions, trade fairs, scientific conferences, and other international meetings.
7. The warning to NATO shipping and civil aircraft to avoid using Soviet Bloc harbors and airports.
8. The closure of NATO country frontiers to Soviet Bloc officials engaging in trade or commerce.
9. The cancellation of arrangements for NATO country participation in exhibitions, trade fairs, scientific conferences, and other international meetings scheduled in Soviet Bloc countries.
10. Preparation and implementation by NATO countries of countermeasures against USSR and "GDR" in form of controls over transport on basis equivalent to any Soviet or GDR harassments.
11. Restrain movement of personnel of Soviet trade missions, including Amtorg, in NATO countries.

Other Non-military

12. Tighten controls over Soviet Bloc personnel at frontiers, ports, and airports of NATO countries as evidence of increased caution.
13. Refuse TTID's to Soviet Zone travelers either on complete or selective basis.
14. Restrict circulation of Soviet Bloc officials and visitors over metropolitan territories of NATO countries.
15. Prohibit tourist travel of Soviet Bloc nationals in NATO countries.
16. Suspend or cancel cultural exchange agreements between Bloc and NATO countries.
17. In light of reactions to earlier stages, consider requesting neutral countries to make representations to USSR for removal of obstructions to Berlin access.

*Military

18. Continue air surveillance along Greenland, Iceland and UK line.
19. Execute anti-submarine surveillance at Straits of Gibraltar and in the Aegean Sea with visible patrolling.
20. Increase air activities (surveillance, military presence, etc.) along Soviet Bloc borders/radar barrier, utilizing resources of Far East Allies to the extent possible.
21. Assemble key tripartite/NATO commanders at Paris for readiness conference.

*Military measures list is tentative. More complete and refined lists are being prepared by the four governments. Maritime control measures are being studied quadripartitely.

Minor Countermeasures (Continued)

22. Augment military guards at autobahn checkpoints, on trains, and at Allied airfields in Berlin.
23. Initiate unilateral/tripartite military police patrols of the autobahn, on a 24-hour basis.
24. Organize all military autobahn traffic to and from Berlin in convoys escorted by armed MP's equipped with two-way communications equipment.
25. Increase utilization of the autobahn and air corridors to Berlin.
26. Increase stockpile of weapons, ammunition, and military supplies in Berlin.
27. Increase reconnaissance flights in the air corridors.
28. Implement appropriate alert measures in Europe to include:
 - a. Intensification of security against sabotage and subversion.
 - b. Reinforce frontiers.
 - c. Cancel routine out-of-area exercises and increase in-place exercises.
 - d. Intensify security restrictions on indigenous employees.
 - e. Increase air defense alert.
29. Control radio traffic to indicate increased alert; vary pattern of detectable communications activity.
30. Reinforce ADIZ measures.

Minor Countermeasures (Continued)

22. Augment military guards at autobahn checkpoints, on trains, and at Allied airfields in Berlin.
23. Initiate unilateral/tripartite military police patrols of the autobahn, on a 24-hour basis.
24. Organize all military autobahn traffic to and from Berlin in convoys escorted by armed MP's equipped with two-way communications equipment.
25. Increase utilization of the autobahn and air corridors to Berlin.
26. Increase stockpile of weapons, ammunition, and military supplies in Berlin.
27. Increase reconnaissance flights in the air corridors.
28. Implement appropriate alert measures in Europe to include:
 - a. Intensification of security against sabotage and subversion.
 - b. Reinforce frontiers.
 - c. Cancel routine out-of-area exercises and increase in-place exercises.
 - d. Intensify security restrictions on indigenous employees.
 - e. Increase air defense alert.
29. Control radio traffic to indicate increased alert; vary pattern of detectable communications activity.
30. Reinforce ADIZ measures.

Major CountermeasuresEconomic

- *1. The prohibition of the use of all financial facilities of the NATO countries to carry on current transactions with the USSR, the Soviet Zone of Germany, the other Soviet Bloc members and their nationals.
- *2. The expulsion of all Soviet Bloc technical experts and foreign trade officials without diplomatic immunity from the NATO countries.
- *3. The freezing of all assets of the members of the Soviet Bloc under jurisdiction of the NATO powers.
- *4. Termination by NATO countries of trade agreements involving Soviet Bloc countries.
- *5. The denial by NATO countries of all exports to Soviet Bloc countries.
- *6. The stoppage of all imports from Soviet Bloc countries to NATO countries.
- *7. The closure of NATO ports to Soviet Bloc shipping and planes and Soviet Bloc chartership.
- *8. The prevention of aircraft of Soviet Bloc countries from making transit overflights and technical stops in NATO countries.
- *9. The prohibition of calling at Soviet Bloc ports of vessels and planes of the NATO countries.

Other Non-Military

10. Intensify surveillance of Soviet Bloc fishing fleets in North Atlantic and North Pacific.
11. Discourage NATO country tourist and nonessential traffic in Europe.

*Measures amounting to a total economic embargo (Annex A of Section V of the Paris Working Group report).

12. Restrict replacement and augmentation of personnel in Soviet Bloc embassies in NATO countries.
13. Close NATO country frontiers to all Soviet Bloc officials and visitors.
14. Jam Soviet Bloc radio broadcasts.

**Military

15. Deploy additional forces (fillers and units) overseas.
16. Increase air capability in Europe (fighter and troop carrier).
17. Seventeenth Air Force conduct exercises in Europe.
18. Sixth Fleet to conduct carrier operations in central and eastern Mediterranean.
19. Conduct tripartite exercises easily identifiable with the problem of forcing access to Berlin via the autobahn.
20. Establish anti-submarine barrier patrol along Greenland-Iceland-UK line.
21. Increase SAC degree of alert by utilizing airborne alert (currently on 50% ground alert).
22. Increase air defense alert, CONUS.
23. Alert additional Reserve component units.
24. Close Panama Canal to Bloc shipping.
25. Move elements of 2d Fleet to war stations (Northern European waters).
26. Augmentation of ASW forces in the Mediterranean.

**Military measures list is tentative. More complete and refined lists are being prepared by the four governments. Maritime control measures being studied quadripartitely.

Major CountermeasuresEconomic

- *1. The prohibition of the use of all financial facilities of the NATO countries to carry on current transactions with the USSR, the Soviet Zone of Germany, the other Soviet Bloc members and their nationals.
- *2. The expulsion of all Soviet Bloc technical experts and foreign trade officials without diplomatic immunity from the NATO countries.
- *3. The freezing of all assets of the members of the Soviet Bloc under jurisdiction of the NATO powers.
- *4. Termination by NATO countries of trade agreements involving Soviet Bloc countries.
- *5. The denial by NATO countries of all exports to Soviet Bloc countries.
- *6. The stoppage of all imports from Soviet Bloc countries to NATO countries.
- *7. The closure of NATO ports to Soviet Bloc shipping and planes and Soviet Bloc chartership.
- *8. The prevention of aircraft of Soviet Bloc countries from making transit overflights and technical stops in NATO countries.
- *9. The prohibition of calling at Soviet Bloc ports of vessels and planes of the NATO countries.

Other Non-Military

10. Intensify surveillance of Soviet Bloc fishing fleets in North Atlantic and North Pacific.
11. Discourage NATO country tourist and nonessential traffic in Europe.

*Measures amounting to a total economic embargo (Annex A of Section V of the Paris Working Group report).

12. Restrict replacement and augmentation of personnel in Soviet Bloc embassies in NATO countries.
13. Close NATO country frontiers to all Soviet Bloc officials and visitors.
14. Jam Soviet Bloc radio broadcasts.

**Military

15. Deploy additional forces (fillers and units) overseas.
16. Increase air capability in Europe (fighter and troop carrier).
17. Seventeenth Air Force conduct exercises in Europe.
18. Sixth Fleet to conduct carrier operations in central and eastern Mediterranean.
19. Conduct tripartite exercises easily identifiable with the problem of forcing access to Berlin via the autobahn.
20. Establish anti-submarine barrier patrol along Greenland-Iceland-UK line.
21. Increase SAC degree of alert by utilizing airborne alert (currently on 50% ground alert).
22. Increase air defense alert, CONUS.
23. Alert additional Reserve component units.
24. Close Panama Canal to Bloc shipping.
25. Move elements of 2d Fleet to war stations (Northern European waters).
26. Augmentation of ASW forces in the Mediterranean.

**Military measures list is tentative. More complete and refined lists are being prepared by the four governments. Maritime control measures being studied quadripartitely.

Major Countermeasures (Continued)

27. Intensify atomic training in all military forces.
28. Conduct submarine exercises in Mediterranean, North Atlantic and/or Pacific.
29. Execute overseas aircraft aquadron dispersal plan.
30. Execute naval countermeasures against Bloc shipping:
 - a. Blockade Bloc shipping in Black Sea (requires Allied support to be successful).
 - b. Blockade in North Sea exits from the Baltic (requires Allied support to be successful).
 - c. Seize Soviet ships in the Western Pacific and in the vicinity of Cuba.
 - d. Announce a "Declaration of Contraband" prohibiting shipment of Communist arms and munitions into Cuba.
 - e. Announce a "Declaration of denial of free passage to Soviet and Bloc ships."
 - f. Discreet mining operations.
 - g. Seize US lend-lease ships possessed by the USSR.
31. Disperse CONUS forces.

Major Countermeasures (Continued)

27. Intensify atomic training in all military forces.
28. Conduct submarine exercises in Mediterranean, North Atlantic and/or Pacific.
29. Execute overseas aircraft aquadron dispersal plan.
30. Execute naval countermeasures against Bloc shipping:
 - a. Blockade Bloc shipping in Black Sea (requires Allied support to be successful).
 - b. Blockade in North Sea exits from the Baltic (requires Allied support to be successful).
 - c. Seize Soviet ships in the Western Pacific and in the vicinity of Cuba.
 - d. Announce a "Declaration of Contraband" prohibiting shipment of Communist arms and munitions into Cuba.
 - e. Announce a "Declaration of denial of free passage to Soviet and Bloc ships."
 - f. Discreet mining operations.
 - g. Seize US lend-lease ships possessed by the USSR.
31. Disperse CONUS forces.

Countermeasures for Interference
with Air Access

1. Closure of NATO Airports to Soviet Bloc aircraft;
2. Prevention of transit overflights and technical stops by Soviet Bloc aircraft in NATO countries;
3. Prohibition against NATO country aircraft calling at Soviet Bloc airports.

NOTE: Item 3 to be implemented 24 hours in advance of items 1 and 2.

Countermeasures for Interference
with Air Access

1. Closure of NATO Airports to Soviet Bloc aircraft;
2. Prevention of transit overflights and technical stops by Soviet Bloc aircraft in NATO countries;
3. Prohibition against NATO country aircraft calling at Soviet Bloc airports.

NOTE: Item 3 to be implemented 24 hours in advance of items 1 and 2.

The Interzonal Trade Agreement1.) Agreements

The Interzonal Trade Agreement was signed in Berlin on 29th December 1960. By this agreement the following earlier agreements and accords were reinstated:

- a) Interzonal Trade Agreement of 20th September 1951 including all annexes and supplementary accords.
- b) The accords of 16th August 1960.

2.) Volume of Interzonal Trade

Volume of interzonal trade in 1960: DM 1.6 Billion - i.e., DM 800 millions worth of trade was carried on with the Soviet Zone in either direction.

3.) Junctim

At the signing of the agreement on 29th December 1960, both sides agreed on the following as a basis for transactions under the Agreement:

- a) The agreement deals with transportation matters only. Thus, political questions are left out, - i.e., Four-Power responsibility for Berlin is not affected thereby.
- b) Prerequisite:
Unimpeded movement of passengers and goods between Berlin and the Federal Republic, and within Berlin.
- c) The passengers permit regulation issued by the zonal authorities on 8th September 1960 is not in fact being applied, - i.e., it has not been repealed formally.
- d) The zonal authorities have agreed to the sealing of trucks and - as far as possible - of ships in transit. This procedure means a considerable simplification.
- e) Our concession to the zonal authorities:
 - aa) Permission for West German firms to attend the Leipzig Fair.
 - bb) Members of the staff of Soviet zonal foreign trade enterprises are not interfered with in pursuit of their business activities in the Federal Republic.

On the basis of the new accords it is possible for the Federal Government at any time to cancel goods consignment papers for individual consignments or for special types of goods. In the negotiations with the zonal authorities our side expressly stated that such cancellation would be affected in the event of interference with movements to or within Berlin. As is known, the Federal Republic has not availed itself of this right of cancellation.

4.) Evaluation

As a result of this junctim, an economic reorganization leading to an ever decreasing dependence on supplies from the Federal Republic has taken place in the Soviet Zone. Experience over the last few months has shown (although figures are not available to support this conclusion) that quotas of goods listed under No. 1 Account - especially iron and steel products as well as machinery - have not been fully taken up, nor have the long-term contracts required for this purpose been concluded. This development has deprived us to a considerable degree of the means of pressure which the interzonal trade agreement hitherto enabled us to bring to bear.

As was shown above, the zonal authorities clearly have violated the junctim implied in the interzonal trade agreement since 13th August 1961; nevertheless we have refrained from denouncing the interzonal trade agreement or from cancellation of the goods consignment papers because of the danger of escalation arising therefrom. For this reason, the other three powers have not adopted our proposal of selective restriction of trade.

The volume of West Berlin's present supplies from the Soviet Zone is as follows:

1960: DM 181 Million
First quarter of 1961: DM 41.1 Million

The Interzonal Trade Agreement1.) Agreements

The Interzonal Trade Agreement was signed in Berlin on 29th December 1960. By this agreement the following earlier agreements and accords were reinstated:

- a) Interzonal Trade Agreement of 20th September 1951 including all annexes and supplementary accords.
- b) The accords of 16th August 1960.

2.) Volume of Interzonal Trade

Volume of interzonal trade in 1960: DM 1.6 Billion - i.e., DM 800 millions worth of trade was carried on with the Soviet Zone in either direction.

3.) Junctim

At the signing of the agreement on 29th December 1960, both sides agreed on the following as a basis for transactions under the Agreement:

- a) The agreement deals with transportation matters only. Thus, political questions are left out, - i.e., Four-Power responsibility for Berlin is not affected thereby.
- b) Prerequisite:
Unimpeded movement of passengers and goods between Berlin and the Federal Republic, and within Berlin.
- c) The passengers permit regulation issued by the zonal authorities on 8th September 1960 is not in fact being applied, - i.e., it has not been repealed formally.
- d) The zonal authorities have agreed to the sealing of trucks and - as far as possible - of ships in transit. This procedure means a considerable simplification.
- e) Our concession to the zonal authorities:
 - aa) Permission for West German firms to attend the Leipzig Fair.
 - bb) Members of the staff of Soviet zonal foreign trade enterprises are not interfered with in pursuit of their business activities in the Federal Republic.

On the basis of the new accords it is possible for the Federal Government at any time to cancel goods consignment papers for individual consignments or for special types of goods. In the negotiations with the zonal authorities our side expressly stated that such cancellation would be affected in the event of interference with movements to or within Berlin. As is known, the Federal Republic has not availed itself of this right of cancellation.

4.) Evaluation

As a result of this junctim, an economic reorganization leading to an ever decreasing dependence on supplies from the Federal Republic has taken place in the Soviet Zone. Experience over the last few months has shown (although figures are not available to support this conclusion) that quotas of goods listed under No. 1 Account - especially iron and steel products as well as machinery - have not been fully taken up, nor have the long-term contracts required for this purpose been concluded. This development has deprived us to a considerable degree of the means of pressure which the interzonal trade agreement hitherto enabled us to bring to bear.

As was shown above, the zonal authorities clearly have violated the junctim implied in the interzonal trade agreement since 13th August 1961; nevertheless we have refrained from denouncing the interzonal trade agreement or from cancellation of the goods consignment papers because of the danger of escalation arising therefrom. For this reason, the other three powers have not adopted our proposal of selective restriction of trade.

The volume of West Berlin's present supplies from the Soviet Zone is as follows:

1960: DM 181 Million
First quarter of 1961: DM 41.1 Million

The viability of West Berlin does not depend on these supplies.

The commercial interest of German business in interzonal trade is small: the Federal Republic's entire East-West trade amounting to DM 4.2 Billion plus interzonal trade amounting to DM 2 Billion represents a mere 7 per cent of our total foreign trade.

It should be pointed out once more that as a result of the above-mentioned shift of the Soviet Zone's most important West German supplies to other countries, the effectiveness of denouncing the interzonal trade agreement has been substantially reduced.

The argument is thus all the more compelling that cessation of interzonal trade can be successful only if all NATO countries stop their supplies to the Soviet Zone.

Washington - 11th September, 1961

This paper submitted by the German delegation.

The viability of West Berlin does not depend on these supplies.

The commercial interest of German business in interzonal trade is small: the Federal Republic's entire East-West trade amounting to DM 4.2 Billion plus interzonal trade amounting to DM 2 Billion represents a mere 7 per cent of our total foreign trade.

It should be pointed out once more that as a result of the above-mentioned shift of the Soviet Zone's most important West German supplies to other countries, the effectiveness of denouncing the interzonal trade agreement has been substantially reduced.

The argument is thus all the more compelling that cessation of interzonal trade can be successful only if all NATO countries stop their supplies to the Soviet Zone.

Washington - 11th September, 1961

This paper submitted by the German delegation.

COUNTERMEASURES FOR BLOCKAGE OF EITHER ALLIED OR GERMAN LAND ACCESS

The occurrence of either of these contingencies brings into being a complex situation of great instability. In general terms, the reaction of the West will be to set in motion a wide range of military (but non-combative) and non-military countermeasures while insisting in direct contacts with the Soviets that the blockage be ended. Depending on the results of initial contacts and in the absence of Soviet action in the direction we desire, the number and severity of countermeasures will be increased. Contacts with the USSR will be raised to the highest levels. As tension mounts other factors will come into play, particularly third country and UN efforts to prevent conflict. At some point, consideration will be given to initiating military operations. (In the case of blockage of German civilian access, attempts might have been made to take German traffic through under Allied aegis.)

It is thus clear that no simple list of countermeasures can be adequate as an expression of planning for these events. In general terms, again, the first countermeasures to be applied after blockage would be less than the most severe actions available; economic measures would be short of full embargo, for example. If the blockage persists, increasingly severe countermeasures would no doubt be required. The period in which this development occurs might be brief or protracted.

For planning purposes, therefore, two lists of countermeasures have been prepared. The first contains those measures which would be taken immediately upon blockage. The second contains those which, depending on circumstances, might be introduced during the succeeding period. (These are the measures constituting the economic embargo which it has been agreed to apply automatically in the event total land access is blocked.) The decision on the timing of the measures in the second list would be made by Governments at the time. The same lists can be used for both contingencies with the exception (as noted in the lists) that interzonal trade would be broken off at once if German access were blocked, but not until a later stage if Allied access were blocked.

NOTE: This Annex has been approved by the US and is being considered by France and Germany; the UK has considered and takes the following position: Countermeasures should be decided by Governments in the light of circumstances at the time. They should be selected from the UK list at Annex 4 of BQD-E-12. Depending on circumstances, the countermeasures imposed would probably be phased in progressively more severe stages with widening scope. There should be full NATO cooperation.

COUNTERMEASURES FOR BLOCKAGE OF EITHER ALLIED OR GERMAN LAND ACCESS

The occurrence of either of these contingencies brings into being a complex situation of great instability. In general terms, the reaction of the West will be to set in motion a wide range of military (but non-combative) and non-military countermeasures while insisting in direct contacts with the Soviets that the blockage be ended. Depending on the results of initial contacts and in the absence of Soviet action in the direction we desire, the number and severity of countermeasures will be increased. Contacts with the USSR will be raised to the highest levels. As tension mounts other factors will come into play, particularly third country and UN efforts to prevent conflict. At some point, consideration will be given to initiating military operations. (In the case of blockage of German civilian access, attempts might have been made to take German traffic through under Allied aegis.)

It is thus clear that no simple list of countermeasures can be adequate as an expression of planning for these events. In general terms, again, the first countermeasures to be applied after blockage would be less than the most severe actions available; economic measures would be short of full embargo, for example. If the blockage persists, increasingly severe countermeasures would no doubt be required. The period in which this development occurs might be brief or protracted.

For planning purposes, therefore, two lists of countermeasures have been prepared. The first contains those measures which would be taken immediately upon blockage. The second contains those which, depending on circumstances, might be introduced during the succeeding period. (These are the measures constituting the economic embargo which it has been agreed to apply automatically in the event total land access is blocked.) The decision on the timing of the measures in the second list would be made by Governments at the time. The same lists can be used for both contingencies with the exception (as noted in the lists) that interzonal trade would be broken off at once if German access were blocked, but not until a later stage if Allied access were blocked.

NOTE: This Annex has been approved by the US and is being considered by France and Germany; the UK has considered and takes the following position: Countermeasures should be decided by Governments in the light of circumstances at the time. They should be selected from the UK list at Annex 4 of BQD-E-12. Depending on circumstances, the countermeasures imposed would probably be phased in progressively more severe stages with widening scope. There should be full NATO cooperation.

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN AT ONCE*Non-Military

1. The closure of Soviet Bloc trade missions, including Amtorg offices, in NATO countries.
2. The refusal by NATO countries to enter into new contracts to charter shipping to Soviet Bloc Countries and suspend existing contracts.
3. The expansion of export control measures by NATO countries against the Soviet Bloc, including selective embargo.
4. The cut-off by NATO countries of selected types of industrial and technical exchanges in which the Soviet Bloc is most interested and ban export of published and unpublished technical and scientific information.
5. The slowdown by NATO countries in issuance of export licenses and foreign exchange licensing for shipments to Soviet Bloc.
6. The cancellation by NATO countries of arrangements for Soviet Bloc participation in exhibitions, trade fairs, scientific conferences, and other international meetings.
7. The warning to NATO shipping and civil aircraft to avoid using Soviet Bloc harbors and airports.
8. The cancellation of arrangements for NATO country participation in exhibitions, trade fairs, scientific conferences, and other international meetings scheduled in Soviet Bloc countries.
9. Preparation and implementation by NATO countries of countermeasures against USSR and "GDR" in form of controls over transport on basis equivalent to any Soviet or GDR harassments.
10. Refuse TTD's to all Soviet Zone travelers.
11. Restrict circulation of Soviet Bloc officials over metropolitan territories of NATO countries.
12. Suspend or cancel cultural exchange agreements between Bloc and NATO countries.
13. Termination by NATO countries of trade agreements involving Soviet Bloc countries.
14. Discourage NATO country tourist and nonessential traffic in Europe.
15. Restrict replacement and augmentation of personnel in Soviet Bloc Embassies in NATO countries.
16. Close NATO country frontiers to all Soviet Bloc officials and visitors.
17. Break off German interzonal trade (in the contingency that German access is blocked).

Military

Selected military countermeasures.**

*The US, France and Germany consider that economic countermeasures should be applied initially against the Soviet Bloc as a whole. The UK believes they should be applied initially against the GDR and later against the Soviet Union and other bloc countries.

**These measures are at present the subject of detailed staff study prior to selecting them for use in particular contingencies.

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN AT ONCE*Non-Military

1. The closure of Soviet Bloc trade missions, including Amtorg offices, in NATO countries.
2. The refusal by NATO countries to enter into new contracts to charter shipping to Soviet Bloc Countries and suspend existing contracts.
3. The expansion of export control measures by NATO countries against the Soviet Bloc, including selective embargo.
4. The cut-off by NATO countries of selected types of industrial and technical exchanges in which the Soviet Bloc is most interested and ban export of published and unpublished technical and scientific information.
5. The slowdown by NATO countries in issuance of export licenses and foreign exchange licensing for shipments to Soviet Bloc.
6. The cancellation by NATO countries of arrangements for Soviet Bloc participation in exhibitions, trade fairs, scientific conferences, and other international meetings.
7. The warning to NATO shipping and civil aircraft to avoid using Soviet Bloc harbors and airports.
8. The cancellation of arrangements for NATO country participation in exhibitions, trade fairs, scientific conferences, and other international meetings scheduled in Soviet Bloc countries.
9. Preparation and implementation by NATO countries of countermeasures against USSR and "GDR" in form of controls over transport on basis equivalent to any Soviet or GDR harassments.
10. Refuse TTD's to all Soviet Zone travelers.
11. Restrict circulation of Soviet Bloc officials over metropolitan territories of NATO countries.
12. Suspend or cancel cultural exchange agreements between Bloc and NATO countries.
13. Termination by NATO countries of trade agreements involving Soviet Bloc countries.
14. Discourage NATO country tourist and nonessential traffic in Europe.
15. Restrict replacement and augmentation of personnel in Soviet Bloc Embassies in NATO countries.
16. Close NATO country frontiers to all Soviet Bloc officials and visitors.
17. Break off German interzonal trade (in the contingency that German access is blocked).

Military

Selected military countermeasures.**

*The US, France and Germany consider that economic countermeasures should be applied initially against the Soviet Bloc as a whole. The UK believes they should be applied initially against the GDR and later against the Soviet Union and other bloc countries.

**These measures are at present the subject of detailed staff study prior to selecting them for use in particular contingencies.

MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN IF BLOCKAGE PERSISTS

(Decision on Timing of Individual Measures to Be Made by Governments)

Non-Military

1. The prohibition of the use of all financial facilities of the NATO countries to carry on current transactions with the USSR, the Soviet Zone of Germany, and other Soviet Bloc members and their Nationals.
2. The expulsion of all Soviet Bloc technical experts and foreign trade officials without diplomatic immunity from the NATO countries.
3. The freezing of all assets of the members of the Soviet Bloc under jurisdiction of the NATO powers.
4. The denial by NATO countries of all exports to Soviet Bloc countries.
5. The stoppage of all imports from Soviet Bloc countries to NATO countries.
6. The closure of NATO ports to Soviet Bloc shipping and planes and Soviet Bloc chartership.
7. The prevention of aircraft of Soviet Bloc countries from making transit overflights and technical stops in NATO countries.
8. The prohibition of calling at Soviet Bloc ports of vessels and planes of the NATO countries.
9. Cutting off of German interzonal trade (in the contingency that Allied access is blocked).

Military

Selected Military countermeasures.*

*These measures are at present the subject of detailed study prior to selecting them for use in particular contingencies.

MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN IF BLOCKAGE PERSISTS

(Decision on Timing of Individual Measures to Be Made by Governments)

Non-Military

1. The prohibition of the use of all financial facilities of the NATO countries to carry on current transactions with the USSR, the Soviet Zone of Germany, and other Soviet Bloc members and their Nationals.
2. The expulsion of all Soviet Bloc technical experts and foreign trade officials without diplomatic immunity from the NATO countries.
3. The freezing of all assets of the members of the Soviet Bloc under jurisdiction of the NATO powers.
4. The denial by NATO countries of all exports to Soviet Bloc countries.
5. The stoppage of all imports from Soviet Bloc countries to NATO countries.
6. The closure of NATO ports to Soviet Bloc shipping and planes and Soviet Bloc chartership.
7. The prevention of aircraft of Soviet Bloc countries from making transit overflights and technical stops in NATO countries.
8. The prohibition of calling at Soviet Bloc ports of vessels and planes of the NATO countries.
9. Cutting off of German interzonal trade (in the contingency that Allied access is blocked).

Military

Selected Military countermeasures.*

*These measures are at present the subject of detailed study prior to selecting them for use in particular contingencies.

TEXTS AND INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO AIR ACCESS

I. Statement to be Made by the Three Embassies at Bonn in Response to a GDR Demand that Western Airlines Register their Radios.

"We cannot recognize any East German attempt to impose conditions on Allied air traffic in the Berlin air corridors. The right of Allied aircraft to fly is founded on Quadripartite agreements and is exercised in accordance with the quadripartitely agreed rules of flight. These rules of flight do not require the special licensing of radio equipment, this being a responsibility which, in accordance with generally accepted international practice, is assumed by the state of registry of the aircraft. Requirements of allied national authorities in respect of radio licensing are consistent with internationally recognized standards and recommended practices of International Civil Aviation Organization and International Telecommunications Union and cover all aspects of safe, interference-free operation."

"Nor can we recognize any east German claim to assert any control over Allied aircraft. Under the quadripartite agreements it is the function of the Berlin air safety center, working through the appropriate airfield air traffic control center, which, in the Allied case, is the Berlin air traffic control at Tempelhof, to ensure the safety of aircraft in the control zone and the corridors. The present system of control has worked satisfactorily for 15 years and there is no reason why it cannot continue to do so."

II. JACK PINE Rules of Engagement.

1. In the event of unprovoked armed attack against aircraft engaged in operations under this plan, IMMEDIATE PURSUIT is authorized. IMMEDIATE PURSUIT will be limited to the degree necessary to protect personnel, property, and to achieve the plan objectives. It is subject to the following restrictions.

- a. IMMEDIATE PURSUIT will not include prolonged pursuit deep into hostile airspace.
- b. Commanders will not be authorized to organize a pursuing force deliberately.
- c. IMMEDIATE PURSUIT authority will apply only to specific incidents.

2. Fighter aircraft will be under the operational control of the JACK PINE Command Post and will receive instructions through AUENHAUSEN GCI (Central Corridor) and TELEGRAM GCI (Southern Corridor). Communications will be between the flight leader and the GDI controller.

3. Tripartite fighters are authorized to engage and open fire on USSR/GDR aircraft only when the latter actually fire at or in the direction of tripartite fighter or transport aircraft, or as may be specifically authorized or directed by CINCUSAFE acting in compliance with instructions of the designated overall commander.

4. Any deviation

TEXTS AND INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO AIR ACCESS

I. Statement to be Made by the Three Embassies at Bonn in Response to a GDR Demand that Western Airlines Register their Radios.

"We cannot recognize any East German attempt to impose conditions on Allied air traffic in the Berlin air corridors. The right of Allied aircraft to fly is founded on Quadripartite agreements and is exercised in accordance with the quadripartitely agreed rules of flight. These rules of flight do not require the special licensing of radio equipment, this being a responsibility which, in accordance with generally accepted international practice, is assumed by the state of registry of the aircraft. Requirements of allied national authorities in respect of radio licensing are consistent with internationally recognized standards and recommended practices of International Civil Aviation Organization and International Telecommunications Union and cover all aspects of safe, interference-free operation."

"Nor can we recognize any east German claim to assert any control over Allied aircraft. Under the quadripartite agreements it is the function of the Berlin air safety center, working through the appropriate airfield air traffic control center, which, in the Allied case, is the Berlin air traffic control at Tempelhof, to ensure the safety of aircraft in the control zone and the corridors. The present system of control has worked satisfactorily for 15 years and there is no reason why it cannot continue to do so."

II. JACK PINE Rules of Engagement.

1. In the event of unprovoked armed attack against aircraft engaged in operations under this plan, IMMEDIATE PURSUIT is authorized. IMMEDIATE PURSUIT will be limited to the degree necessary to protect personnel, property, and to achieve the plan objectives. It is subject to the following restrictions.

- a. IMMEDIATE PURSUIT will not include prolonged pursuit deep into hostile airspace.
- b. Commanders will not be authorized to organize a pursuing force deliberately.
- c. IMMEDIATE PURSUIT authority will apply only to specific incidents.

2. Fighter aircraft will be under the operational control of the JACK PINE Command Post and will receive instructions through AUENHAUSEN GCI (Central Corridor) and TELEGRAM GCI (Southern Corridor). Communications will be between the flight leader and the GDI controller.

3. Tripartite fighters are authorized to engage and open fire on USSR/GDR aircraft only when the latter actually fire at or in the direction of tripartite fighter or transport aircraft, or as may be specifically authorized or directed by CINCUSAFE acting in compliance with instructions of the designated overall commander.

4. Any deviation

4. Any deviation from the above Rules of Engagement required at the time of the operation will be authorized only by CINCUSAFE from the JACK PINE Command Post acting on the instruction of the designated overall commander.

III. United States Note of August 26, 1961, to the Soviet Government in Reply to Soviet Note of August 23, 1961 (Identical Notes Sent by UK and France).

Following is the text of the United States note to the Soviet Union which was delivered August 26, to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the American Embassy at Moscow. Identical notes were also delivered by the Embassies of the United Kingdom and France in Moscow:

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the Ministry's note number 84/OSA of August 23, 1961, in connection with which the Embassy, upon the instructions of its Government, is authorized to state the following:

The Government of the Soviet Union objects in its note to the use by the Western Allies of their air corridors to Berlin. The United States Government must protest strongly against the suggestion that the purposes for which the Western Allies use the air corridors are within the competence of the Soviet Union. These corridors were established in 1945 by decision of the Four Power Allied Control Council as the manner in which the unrestricted right of air access to Berlin would be exercised by the Western Powers. There has never been any limitation whatsoever placed upon their use by the aircraft of the Western Powers. The United States Government will hold the Government of the Soviet Union responsible for any interference with the safety of these aircraft in the corridors.

The Government of the USSR in its note accuses the Western Powers of violating the Four-Power Agreements of 1945. In particular, it reproaches them for their "connivance at the interference of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany in the affairs of West Berlin and at the use of the territory of the city for international provocations..." and insists "that the Government of the U.S.A., which at present exercises occupation functions in West Berlin, take steps to stop the illegal and provocative actions of the Federal Republic of Germany in that city."

This demand is at the very least surprising. Indeed, since the night of August 12 to 13 the authorities of East Germany, with the concurrence of the Soviet Union, as the note of the Soviet Government dated August 18 attests, have not ceased taking unilateral measures which do precisely violate the Four-Power agreements and the freedom of movement within the city of Berlin. First they erected barricades, strengthened from day to day, to stop the traffic from East to West, in order, in fact, to put an end to the increasing exodus of refugees. For some days the same authorities have been attempting to establish unilateral and arbitrary control over access to East Berlin by the inhabitants of West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. And they have just limited to a single point the possibilities of movement of the Allies from West to East. Moreover, the inhabitants of East Berlin who worked in West Berlin have been denied the pursuit of their occupations. If there are "illegal and provocative actions", they are certainly those of the authorities of East Germany in taking such measures. As the United States note delivered to the Soviet Government on July 17 stated, if there is a crisis in Berlin, it is certainly the doing of the Soviet Union. Did not the number of refugees increase considerably from the day on which the Soviet Government made apparent the imminence of the implementation of its plan for a separate "peace treaty" and a "free city"?

The Soviet

4. Any deviation from the above Rules of Engagement required at the time of the operation will be authorized only by CINCUSAFE from the JACK PINE Command Post acting on the instruction of the designated overall commander.

III. United States Note of August 26, 1961, to the Soviet Government in Reply to Soviet Note of August 23, 1961 (Identical Notes Sent by UK and France).

Following is the text of the United States note to the Soviet Union which was delivered August 26, to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the American Embassy at Moscow. Identical notes were also delivered by the Embassies of the United Kingdom and France in Moscow:

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the Ministry's note number 84/OSA of August 23, 1961, in connection with which the Embassy, upon the instructions of its Government, is authorized to state the following:

The Government of the Soviet Union objects in its note to the use by the Western Allies of their air corridors to Berlin. The United States Government must protest strongly against the suggestion that the purposes for which the Western Allies use the air corridors are within the competence of the Soviet Union. These corridors were established in 1945 by decision of the Four Power Allied Control Council as the manner in which the unrestricted right of air access to Berlin would be exercised by the Western Powers. There has never been any limitation whatsoever placed upon their use by the aircraft of the Western Powers. The United States Government will hold the Government of the Soviet Union responsible for any interference with the safety of these aircraft in the corridors.

The Government of the USSR in its note accuses the Western Powers of violating the Four-Power Agreements of 1945. In particular, it reproaches them for their "connivance at the interference of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany in the affairs of West Berlin and at the use of the territory of the city for international provocations..." and insists "that the Government of the U.S.A., which at present exercises occupation functions in West Berlin, take steps to stop the illegal and provocative actions of the Federal Republic of Germany in that city."

This demand is at the very least surprising. Indeed, since the night of August 12 to 13 the authorities of East Germany, with the concurrence of the Soviet Union, as the note of the Soviet Government dated August 18 attests, have not ceased taking unilateral measures which do precisely violate the Four-Power agreements and the freedom of movement within the city of Berlin. First they erected barricades, strengthened from day to day, to stop the traffic from East to West, in order, in fact, to put an end to the increasing exodus of refugees. For some days the same authorities have been attempting to establish unilateral and arbitrary control over access to East Berlin by the inhabitants of West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. And they have just limited to a single point the possibilities of movement of the Allies from West to East. Moreover, the inhabitants of East Berlin who worked in West Berlin have been denied the pursuit of their occupations. If there are "illegal and provocative actions", they are certainly those of the authorities of East Germany in taking such measures. As the United States note delivered to the Soviet Government on July 17 stated, if there is a crisis in Berlin, it is certainly the doing of the Soviet Union. Did not the number of refugees increase considerably from the day on which the Soviet Government made apparent the imminence of the implementation of its plan for a separate "peace treaty" and a "free city"?

The Soviet

The Soviet Government protests against the presence in West Berlin of personalities from the Federal Republic, such as, for example: "Mr. Gerstenmaier, the President of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany; Mr. Krone, the Chairman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag fraction; Mr. Ollenhauer, the President of the SPD, Mr. Mende, President of the FDP, and others. The United States Government does not understand the position of the Soviet Government. West Berlin has a wide variety of ties with the Federal Republic that are in no way incompatible with the Four-Power status of Berlin. These accusations are all the more inadmissible since, for a long time and even quite recently, the Soviet Union as well as the East German authorities have been trying to integrate East Berlin completely into East Germany by isolating it from the outside and attempting to make it the capital of East Germany.

The fundamental fact is that the whole of Berlin has a quadripartite status. The United States Government notes that the Soviet Government explicitly recognizes the rights and responsibilities of the Western Powers in Berlin. Unlike the Soviet Government, the Western Powers have always taken great care to see that the special status of the city as a whole is protected and preserved in accordance with Four Power Agreements. The Western Powers have established through procedures and safeguards for this purpose and the Soviet Government is well aware of this. The United States is willing as always to consider any legitimate complaints which the Soviet Union may put forward, but the allegations in the Soviet note are false.

Accordingly, it is up to the Soviet Union and not the United States to take measures to allay the state of tension and unrest which has developed in Berlin. The whole world will be concerned at the scarcely veiled threat of aggression against the Allied air routes to and from West Berlin. The United States must serve a solemn warning to the Soviet Union that interference by the Soviet Government or its East German regime with free access to Berlin would have the most serious consequences for which it would bear full responsibility.

The Soviet Government protests against the presence in West Berlin of personalities from the Federal Republic, such as, for example: "Mr. Gerstenmaier, the President of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany; Mr. Krone, the Chairman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag fraction; Mr. Ollenhauer, the President of the SPD, Mr. Mende, President of the FDP, and others. The United States Government does not understand the position of the Soviet Government. West Berlin has a wide variety of ties with the Federal Republic that are in no way incompatible with the Four-Power status of Berlin. These accusations are all the more inadmissible since, for a long time and even quite recently, the Soviet Union as well as the East German authorities have been trying to integrate East Berlin completely into East Germany by isolating it from the outside and attempting to make it the capital of East Germany.

The fundamental fact is that the whole of Berlin has a quadripartite status. The United States Government notes that the Soviet Government explicitly recognizes the rights and responsibilities of the Western Powers in Berlin. Unlike the Soviet Government, the Western Powers have always taken great care to see that the special status of the city as a whole is protected and preserved in accordance with Four Power Agreements. The Western Powers have established through procedures and safeguards for this purpose and the Soviet Government is well aware of this. The United States is willing as always to consider any legitimate complaints which the Soviet Union may put forward, but the allegations in the Soviet note are false.

Accordingly, it is up to the Soviet Union and not the United States to take measures to allay the state of tension and unrest which has developed in Berlin. The whole world will be concerned at the scarcely veiled threat of aggression against the Allied air routes to and from West Berlin. The United States must serve a solemn warning to the Soviet Union that interference by the Soviet Government or its East German regime with free access to Berlin would have the most serious consequences for which it would bear full responsibility.